

















and Mikko SpolanderIn 2006 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO. 579 / JANUARY 2006
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=873592.
A DISAGGREGATED 
FRAMEWORK FOR 

















1    We would like to thank Karsten Wendorff, Kris Van Cauter, Matthias Mohr, Maria Rosaria Marino, members of the ESCB Working Group 
on Public Finance and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Banco de Portugal, De Nederlandsche Bank,
the National Bank of Belgium, Banca d’Italia, the European Central Bank, or Suomen Pankki.
2     Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; e-mail: jana.kremer@bundesbank.de
3     Banco de Portugal, Av. Almirante Reis, 71, 1150-012 Lisbon, Portugal; e-mail: crbraz@bportugal.pt
4    De Nederlandsche Bank, Westeinde 1, NL-1017 ZN Amsterdam, The Netherlands; e-mail: t.brosens@dnb.nl
5    Banque Nationale de Belgique, Boulevard de Berlaimont 14, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium; e-mail: geert.langenus@nbb.be
6 Banca d’Italia, Via Nazionale 91, I-00184 Rome, Italy; e-mail: sandro.momigliano@bancaditalia.it
7   European Central Bank and Suomen Pankki, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; e-mail: mikko.spolander@ecb.int© European Central Bank, 2006
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Any reproduction, publication and
reprint in the form of a different
publication, whether printed or
produced electronically, in whole or in
part, is permitted only with the explicit
written authorisation of the ECB or the
author(s).
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB
Working Paper Series is available from









1. Introduction and overview 7
2. The analytical framework 9
2.1 Measuring structural balances 9
2.2 Identifying the sources of changes in
structural balances 11
2.2.1 Revenue developments 12
2.2.2 Expenditure developments 14
2.3 The application of the disaggregated
framework to fiscal forecasts 15
3. Analysing budgetary developments in
individual countries 15









Appendix A: Elasticities, information on
temporary measures, tables on
structural levels and figures on
structural developments for
individual countries 40
Appendix B: Breakdown of growth in revenue
from taxes and social contributions 56
Appendix C: Description of country-specific
extensions of the approach 59




In this paper, we present a disaggregated framework for the analysis of past and projected 
structural developments in the most relevant revenue and expenditure categories and the fiscal 
balance. The framework, in particular, distinguishes between the effects of discretionary fiscal 
policy and of macroeconomic and other developments and is sufficiently standardised to be 
used in multi-country studies. 
 
Here, it is applied to Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal over the 
period 1998 to 2004. During this period the structural primary balance ratio clearly worsened 
in all countries except Finland. In Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, both revenue and 
expenditure contributed to the deterioration of the structural primary balance. In Germany the 
large deterioration in revenue was partially offset by the decline in the structural primary 
expenditure ratio, while the opposite was true for Portugal. The analysis highlights the various 
factors that contributed to these developments. 
 
 
Keywords: Structural budget balance, fiscal forecasting and monitoring, fiscal indicators 
JEL classification: H20, H50, H60, E69 
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Non-technical summary 
Public finances are influenced by a variety of factors related to the economic environment, the 
legal and institutional setting and policy decisions. The number and heterogeneity of these 
factors, coupled with the lack, in some cases, of standardised criteria to assess their effects, 
often reduce the transparency of the analysis of fiscal developments and hamper country 
comparisons. These problems are particularly relevant when individual components of reve-
nue and expenditure are examined. Moreover, temporary influences on public finances sig-
nificantly modify the path of fiscal variables and, if not properly taken into account, risk ob-
scuring the underlying developments.  
 
In this paper we present an integrated framework in which the various factors can be distin-
guished and the policy effects can be isolated. The framework is sufficiently standardised to 
be used in a multi-country analysis of public finance developments and allows for a detailed 
analysis of both past and projected developments. It aims at 1) identifying the structural path 
of the general government balance and the main expenditure and revenue categories, defined 
by excluding the transitory effects of the economic cycle and the temporary measures taken 
by governments, and 2) examining the impact of a few important factors, common to all 
countries, on the structural development of the fiscal aggregates and the fiscal balance.  
 
On the revenue side, direct and indirect taxes, social contributions and non-tax-related reve-
nue are distinguished. Changes in structural revenue ratios of taxes and social contributions 
are attributed to the following factors: (i) the fiscal drag, (ii) the decoupling of the tax base 
from GDP, (iii) discretionary fiscal policy measures of a permanent nature and (iv) residual 
developments. The first two factors show the impact of macroeconomic developments. The 
third factor identifies the impact of fiscal policy. The residual captures the effects of other, 
mostly country-specific factors that need to be explained on a case-by-case basis. 
 
On the expenditure side, changes in the structural expenditure ratio are split into the contribu-
tion of interest payments, social payments, subsidies, compensation of public employees, in-
termediate consumption, government investment and an aggregate of other categories. Addi-
tional information is provided concerning changes in the number of public employees, health 
expenditure, old-age pensions, unemployment benefits and social transfers in kind. The 
method therefore represents a first step towards identifying the main factors affecting the 
structural expenditure ratio and quantifying their impact on the evolution of the fiscal balance. 
 
The analysis is applied to six countries − Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Portugal, the home countries of the authors − over the period from 1998 to 2004, i.e. in 
the period which followed the year relevant for the qualification for EMU and in which public 
finances deteriorated significantly in most of the considered countries. As is illustrated for the 
case of Belgium, the approach also helps to increase the transparency of fiscal forecasts. 
Overall, the collection of country studies demonstrates that the framework provides a clear 
structure yet is also flexible enough to be applied in a multi-country setting. It can be put to 
use in the analysis and monitoring of past and projected developments in public finances. 
Furthermore, it allows for a continuous evaluation of forecasting tools. 
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As the analysis shows, the primary budget balance ratios worsened in structural terms in al-
most all of the six countries, even though the unadjusted budget balances do not display a 
common trend over the 1998-2004 period. The exception is Finland. Here, a significant re-
duction of the fiscal burden was more than compensated for on the expenditure side. The fall 
in the structural primary expenditure ratio was supported by the strong trend GDP growth. 
Also in Germany, both the structural revenue and primary expenditure ratios declined. Ex-
penditure-side consolidation in the later years of the period was, however, not strong enough 
to offset the overall increase, in particular, in the social payments ratio and several adverse 
revenue-side developments. In the other countries, the structural primary expenditure ratios 
rose over the reporting period. Increases in the structural ratio of social payments to GDP 
played a role in Belgium, Italy and Portugal. Here, old-age and health-care-related expendi-
ture were particularly relevant. Furthermore, compensation of employees increased as a per-
centage of trend GDP in Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal. Only in Portugal was the 
deterioration on the expenditure side partly offset by a rising structural revenue ratio. It has to 
be noted, however, that the increase was, inter alia, related to public sector developments that 
are also reflected on the expenditure side. In Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, the structural 
revenue ratio decreased. This was partly attributable to cuts in taxes and social contribution 
rates. However, other factors, too, contributed to the fall. For example, in the Netherlands and 
Italy, direct taxes payable by corporations adjusted for legislation changes grew, overall, sig-
nificantly more slowly than trend GDP. In Belgium, in particular, the low trend growth in 
private sector wage income relative to GDP had a negative influence on the structural ratios of 
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1. Introduction and overview 
Public finances are influenced by a variety of factors related to the economic environment, the 
legal and institutional setting and policy decisions. The number and heterogeneity of these 
factors, coupled with the lack, in some cases, of standardised criteria to assess their effects, 
often reduce the transparency of the analysis of fiscal developments and hamper country 
comparisons. These problems are particularly relevant when individual components of reve-
nue and expenditure are examined. Moreover, temporary influences on public finances sig-
nificantly modify the path of fiscal variables and, if not properly taken into account, risk ob-
scuring the underlying developments. 
 
In order to enhance the transparency and effectiveness of economic analysis in this domain, 
there is a clear need to distinguish the factors that affect public finances in broad categories 
and apply, whenever possible, standardised methods to evaluate their impact. In particular, it 
is important to separate the effects of policy decisions from those of other factors and to ex-
clude the effects of transitory elements, such as the impact of the economic cycle and tempo-
rary measures. 
 
Starting at least from the fifties (Brown, 1956), a vast number of studies concerned with fiscal 
policies have corrected fiscal balances for the effects of fluctuations in economic activity. 
Many institutions – the European Commission, the IMF and the OECD among them – now 
regularly produce indicators of cyclically adjusted budget balances. The issue of discretionary 
measures with a temporary impact on the budget has come to the fore more recently, largely 
in the European context. In European Commission (2004) and in Koen and van den Noord 
(2005) it is shown that the effects of one-off measures have been substantial and persistent in 
some European countries in the last years. Recent stability and convergence programmes 
submitted by the European member states indicate that the resort to one-off measures contin-
ues to be substantial. 
 
The literature shows that many factors, of a temporary and more permanent nature, may influ-
ence the development of public finances, together with government budgetary actions. What 
seems to be lacking is an integrated framework in which the various factors can be distin-
guished and the policy effects can be isolated. This paper endeavours to launch the process of 
filling this gap by proposing a framework of analysis that aims at 1) identifying the structural 
path of the general government balance and the main expenditure and revenue categories, net 
of their transitory component, and 2) examining the impact of a few important factors, com-
mon to all countries, on the structural development of the fiscal aggregates and the fiscal bal-
ance.2 The framework is sufficiently standardised to be used in a multi-country analysis of 
public finance developments. It allows for a detailed analysis of both past and projected 
developments. 
 
The framework can be applied to nominal government budget balances but also allows ad-
justment for transitory factors. Here, we focus on “structural” developments,3 defined as 
                                                 
2  See Kremer and Wendorff (2004) for an application of a slightly different version of the method. 
3  For a discussion of the concept of structural budget balances and its possible uses see, e.g. Boije (2004). 
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changes in the ratio of each individual budgetary category with respect to nominal trend GDP 
excluding the transitory effects of the economic cycle and the temporary measures taken by 
governments. Cyclical effects and temporary measures are usually the most important transi-
tory factors.4 However, it should be borne in mind that the proposed adjustment does not cap-
ture all temporary influences on public finances. For example, the development in asset prices 
had significant transitory effects on budget balances in recent years.5 Since a number of prob-
lems make a precise assessment difficult even at the national level (frequent changes in legis-
lation, implicit lags in tax rules), a standardised treatment is not proposed here. The assess-
ment of cyclical effects on each budgetary category is based on the methodology developed 
within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).6 Contrary to most other cyclical 
adjustment methods that focus on the aggregate output gap, i.e. the deviation of output from 
its potential level,7 it also corrects budgetary outcomes for the impact of cyclical fluctuations 
in the composition of aggregate demand and national income. Moreover, the ESCB approach 
is applied to individual revenue and expenditure categories – a prerequisite for the disaggre-
gated analysis proposed here. 
 
On the revenue side, a distinction is made between direct and indirect taxes, social contribu-
tions and non-tax-related revenue. Changes in structural revenue ratios of taxes and social 
contributions are attributed to the following factors: (i) the fiscal drag, (ii) the decoupling of 
the tax base from GDP, (iii) discretionary fiscal policy measures of a permanent nature and 
(iv) residual developments. The first two factors show the impact of macroeconomic devel-
opments. The third factor identifies the impact of fiscal policy. The residual captures the ef-
fects of other, mostly country-specific factors. Residuals need to be explained on a case-by-
case basis and have an important role when assessing the consistency of fiscal forecasts.8 
 
On the expenditure side, changes in the structural expenditure ratio are split into the contribu-
tion of interest payments, social payments, subsidies, compensation of public employees, in-
termediate consumption, government investment and an aggregate of other categories. Addi-
tional information is provided concerning changes in the number of public employees, health 
expenditure, old-age pensions, unemployment benefits and social transfers in kind. Thus, the 
method represents a first step towards identifying the main factors affecting the structural ex-
                                                 
4   The Report “Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact” approved by the European 
Council of 22-23 April 2005 proposes the same correction to identify the adjustment effort of member states 
of the euro area or ERM II not satisfying the medium-term objective. 
5   Various papers show the potentially major impact of asset price fluctuations on government revenue. 
Girouard and Price (2004) correct cyclical adjustment for these fluctuations for several countries, while 
Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002) estimate the elasticity of tax revenues to asset price changes. They show 
that the asset price boom may have generated over 1% of GDP of excess revenue in 2001 compared to 1997 
in several European countries. 
6   For an extensive description of the ESCB’s cyclical adjustment procedure see Bouthevillain et al. (2001). A 
review of some alternative approaches to the cyclical adjustment of government budgets, as well as a 
discussion of the role of this indicator in the European context, can be found in Banca d’Italia (1999).  
7  In particular, the estimates of structural balances that are regularly published by the European Commission, 
the IMF and the OECD are based on output gaps. A short description of this method, together with recent 
estimates of budgetary sensitivities, can be found, for example, in Girouard and André (2005).  
8   Girouard and Price (2004) calculate residuals in a similar manner for a different set of countries. However, 
they restrict attention to the relationship between asset price cycles and residual developments, while the 
disaggregated calculations we provide here allow for a deeper analysis of the underlying causes of residuals. 
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penditure ratio and quantifying their impact on the evolution of the fiscal balance. In the case 
of expenditure, the budgetary effects of legislation changes are not identified here. Legislative 
acts on expenditure are usually numerous and the assessment of their effects often involves a 
number of arbitrary assumptions. Moreover, discretionary actions taken at the administrative 
level are often even more important than parliamentary legislation.9 
 
The analysis is applied to six countries − Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Portugal − over the period from 1998 to 2004, i.e. in the period which followed the year 
relevant for the qualification for EMU. In all countries but Finland the structural primary bal-
ance ratio clearly worsened during the period, and the analysis contributes to shedding light 
on the causes and characteristics of these adverse developments. As is illustrated for the case 
of Belgium, the approach also helps to increase the transparency of fiscal forecasts. 
 
In Section 2 the proposed framework of analysis is described in greater detail. In Section 3 we 
present an overview of the common features of the budgetary developments which emerge 
from the analysis, followed by six paragraphs, each dealing with a specific country. Section 4 
concludes the paper. Tables with the structural levels of the analysed fiscal data, information 
on temporary influences and the underlying budget elasticities, and a graphical display of the 
structural developments in the various countries may be found in Appendix A. Appendix B 
contains the details of the calculations underlying the proposed framework, while Appendix C 
provides a summary of country specifics. 
 
2. The analytical framework 
The calculations follow a two-step procedure, and, for each country, the results of each step 
are summarised in a table.10 In the first step, the structural levels of revenue and expenditure 
categories are derived (Table 1, see Appendix A.3). In the second step, the changes in those 
corrected aggregates are attributed to a few relevant factors which are common to all coun-
tries (Table 2, see Section 3). Both tables first summarise the impact of the main adjustments 
made to construct the structural ratios, showing the effects of the cycle and of temporary 
measures. 
 
2.1 Measuring structural balances 
Table 111 identifies the structural levels of the main budgetary categories. For each budgetary 
category  X  the following calculation is performed: 
{ { { { =−−
Structural Unadjusted Cyclical Size of temporary
level level component measures
sc m XX X X . 
For information, we show the unadjusted level of the fiscal balance, its cyclical component 
and the size of temporary measures as ratios to nominal GDP in the first part of Table 1. 
                                                 
9   The same asymmetry, which reasonably stems from similar difficulties, can be found in the analysis of the 
“structural effort” for France, discussed in Duchene and Levy (2003).  
10 In Appendix C country-specific extensions of the framework of analysis are described. 
11 Note that Table 1 deviates from the ESA classification with regard to transactions between the national and 
the EU budget; see Appendix C.3. 
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For determining cyclical impacts, the harmonised ESCB method is used.12 In this approach, 
revenue and expenditure categories are adjusted individually on the basis of the deviation 
from trend of the respective macroeconomic bases in real terms. The trend is estimated using 
a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of λ=30.13 The cyclical component of a 
specific budgetary category is calculated by applying a constant elasticity to the trend devia-
tion (see Appendix A.1 for a summary of elasticities). On the revenue side, taxes and social 
contributions are adjusted; on the expenditure side, generally only unemployment-related 
expenditure is corrected. In the standard implementation the following budgetary categories 
are adjusted (with corresponding macroeconomic bases in brackets): direct taxes on private 
household income (average compensation of employees and employment in the private 
sector), direct taxes on corporate income (operating surplus), social contributions paid in the 
private sector (average compensation of employees and employment in the private sector), 
indirect taxes (private consumption), unemployment-related expenditure (number of 
unemployed persons). Average compensation of employees and private consumption are 
expressed in real terms using the private consumption deflator; for operating surplus the GDP 
deflator is used. 
 
Concerning temporary measures, their effects on budgetary categories have been assessed by 
each of the authors for his or her own country, on the basis of the following precepts: first, 
effects on public finances are considered as temporary if they affect the budgetary outcomes 
for a limited number of years (in practice up to three years). The temporary influence can be 
either strictly one-off or self-reversing; in the latter case measures will be regarded as tempo-
rary even if the reverse effects take more than three years to unwind (e.g. a capital transfer in 
return for the assumption of pension liabilities). Second, only significant effects with a fa-
vourable or unfavourable budgetary impact of at least close to 0.1% of GDP are taken into 
account. In particular, the effects of uncoordinated decisions taken by regional or local au-
thorities that are not themselves significant are excluded. Third, attention is restricted to gov-
ernment policy actions excluding events outside the control of governments. In general, the 
definition of a temporary measure requires a clear benchmark. Usually, this is particularly 
difficult to obtain for expenditure-side measures, and the major impact of the measures con-
sidered occurs on the revenue side.14 For information on the temporary measures included in 
the analysis see Appendix A.2. 
 
The structural revenue and expenditure categories are expressed as percentages of nominal 
trend GDP. We use the nominal trend GDP, instead of its actual level, as the denominator to 
ensure consistency with the cyclically adjusted figures in the numerator.15 In this way, year-
on-year changes in GDP ratios owing to cyclical fluctuations in GDP and the macroeconomic 
bases are eliminated. Nominal trend GDP is defined as the real trend GDP (estimated using 
                                                 
12 Cf. Bouthevillain et al. (2001). 
13 The choice of the value of the parameter is discussed in Bouthevillain et al. (2001).  
14 Revenues from the sales of UMTS licences and real estate, which are classified as negative “acquisition of 
non-financial assets” and “investment”, respectively, form the major exceptions. Sales of UMTS licences 
improved the 2000 budget balance in Germany by 2.5% of GDP, in the Netherlands by 0.6% of GDP and in 
Italy by 1.2% of GDP. Sales of real estate improved the balance in Italy by 0.9% of GDP in 2002. 
15 Indeed, the cyclical adjustment aims at bringing budgetary items to levels they would obtain with 
macroeconomic bases on trend. 
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the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of λ=30) multiplied by the actual GDP 
deflator. 
 
2.2 Identifying the sources of changes in structural balances 
The main output of the proposed framework is shown in Table 2, displaying the decomposi-
tion of changes in the structural ratios, as defined above, of the balance and the main budg-
etary categories. Country results are shown in Section 3. 
 
Table 2 first summarises the impact of the main adjustments made to construct the structural 
ratios, showing the role of the changes in the effects of the cycle and temporary measures. 
These factors explain almost entirely the difference between the change in the unadjusted 
balance ratio (i.e. the unadjusted balance divided by nominal GDP) and the change in the 
structural balance ratio (i.e. the adjusted balance divided by nominal trend GDP). The 
impact of the different denominator (trend GDP instead of actual GDP) is usually negligible 
and therefore not shown. 
 
In the next step, the interest payments are eliminated from the structural balance ratio: 
{ { {
=+
Structural primary Structural Structural
balance-to-GDP balance-to-GDP ratio of interest




where Y  denotes the nominal trend GDP, B  the structural balance, 
p B  the structural primary 
balance and I interest payments. 
 
The resulting structural primary balance ratio is the starting point for analysing structural 
revenue and primary expenditure developments. Annual changes in interest payments are at-
tributed to two factors: 1) changes in the average interest rate on public debt and 2) changes in 
the stock of debt. The contribution of the changes in the average interest rate is computed as 






where  t D  denotes the debt level and 









 the average interest rate on public 
debt. The contribution of the change in the stock of debt is computed as a residual. 
 
This decomposition shows that the very favourable debt refinancing conditions in recent years 
have improved public finances significantly. The analysis could be deepened further by taking 
into account the impact of changes in the debt structure. Since this aspect is not the main fo-
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2.2.1 Revenue developments 
In the next part of Table 2 the changes in the structural revenue ratios are analysed. Taxes 
and social contributions, on the one hand, and non-tax-related revenue, on the other, are ex-
amined separately. Taxes are further broken down into 1) direct taxes payable by corpora-
tions, 2) direct taxes payable by households 3) social contributions and 4) indirect taxes. For 
the non-tax-related revenue the role of the EU transactions within this category is identified.16 
 
The changes in the structural revenue ratios of taxes and social contributions are attributed to 
four factors: fiscal drag, decoupling of the tax base from GDP, legislation changes and a re-
sidual. Appendix B presents the full formula for the analysis. When computing the effects of 
the first two factors we apply the same macroeconomic bases and elasticities as in the ESCB 
methodology for cyclical adjustment. Thus we assume, in particular, that the response of taxes 
and social contributions to their macroeconomic bases is broadly captured by constant elas-
ticities. As an additional piece of information, the table shows those parts of the first two fac-
tors which have an equal impact on both the revenue and expenditure side and therefore do 
not affect the balance, i.e. direct taxes and social contributions on the civil servants’ wage bill 
and indirect taxes paid by the general government.17 
 
Fiscal drag. The term fiscal drag usually refers to the increase in average tax rates in a pro-
gressive income tax scheme that comes about when nominal incomes rise over time – either 
by inflation or by real growth. Here, the term is used in a broader sense: it applies not only to 
progressive income taxes which have elasticities with respect to tax bases larger than one, but 
to all revenue items which have elasticities different from unity. As such, the fiscal drag asso-
ciated with a positive income change can even be negative. This applies, for instance, to ex-
cise taxes: as they are volume-based, price increases may leave tax revenues unaffected or 
lead to revenue decreases while the corresponding nominal tax base would rise. Conse-
quently, the ratio of excise taxes to the nominal trend base would decrease. The basic idea of 
the broader definition is to capture any change in the revenue ratio that arises automatically, 
i.e. without legislation changes and trend growth differentials between the tax base and GDP. 
 
The contribution of fiscal drag in a revenue category to the change of the structural revenue 
ratio is generally computed as18 






where ε  denotes the elasticity of the revenue category R  with respect to its macroeconomic 
tax base, g  the nominal trend growth rate of the base19 and Y  the nominal trend GDP. 
                                                 
16 See Appendix C.3 for the derivation of this item in the case of Portugal. 
17 Since separate information on taxes and social contributions paid by the government is not always available, 
these parts of taxes and social contributions might have been estimated. If separate information is available, 
not only public sector fiscal drag and decoupling but also the public sector part of the residual are included in 
the relevant memo item. Since the expenditure impact of changes in indirect tax payments by the government 
is often minor, in Table 2 it is not shown separately even though it is included in the overall effect. 
18 The formula shown here is a simplification. The detailed version of the formula is presented in Appendix B. 
19 Similarly to nominal trend GDP, the nominal trend of a macroeconomic base is calculated by multiplying its 
real trend with the respective deflator. 
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Decoupling of the tax base from GDP. In the absence of legislation changes, the ratio of a 
revenue category to nominal (trend) GDP might change even when the elasticity with respect 
to the macroeconomic base amounts to unity. This can happen when the (trend) growth rate of 
the tax base deviates from the (trend) growth rate of nominal GDP. This deviation is denoted 
as decoupling of the tax base from GDP.  
 
Decoupling may occur for a variety of reasons. For example, direct taxes are linked to factor 
income. Therefore, deviations in the trend development of GDP and national income, for in-
stance owing to changes in indirect taxes or in the balance of primary income from the rest of 
the world, might imply a decoupling. In addition, longer-term changes in the relative factor 
incomes can lead to decoupling. Because of size differences between the affected revenue 
categories, the decoupling for the different categories do not necessary offset each other. For 
indirect taxes, decoupling might occur due to different medium term development between 
private consumption, which serves as the basis of indirect taxes in the framework, and (partly) 
tax-exempt GDP components, such as private investment or exported goods. 
 
Decoupling between the tax base and GDP has to be distinguished from the component of the 
revenue development that cannot be explained by the underlying “tax model”, for example 
because the available macroeconomic data does not match the actual tax base or because 
time-varying lags between the development in the revenue and in the base are not captured in 
the model approach. Discrepancies of this kind would be reflected in the residual. 
 
The contribution of decoupling of the tax base from GDP to the change of the structural reve-
nue ratio (for each revenue category) is generally computed as20 






where, in addition to the notation introduced above, γ  refers to the growth rate of nominal 
trend GDP. 
 
Legislation changes. Usually, a significant part of the change in the structural revenue ratios 
is due to changes in tax and social contributions laws. Expressed as a percentage of nominal 
trend GDP, the estimated direct impact of such changes is given in the row legislation 
changes. To assess the impact of legislation changes, we rely in many cases on the govern-
ment estimates that are provided during the legislative process. These were updated on the 
basis of ex-post information (like cash data or information concerning the development of the 
underlying tax base) when it seemed appropriate and feasible. In the absence of official esti-
mates, the impact of legislation changes is calculated on the basis of the best available infor-
mation. As such, when interpreting the presented results, it has to be kept in mind that the 
estimation of the fiscal effects of legislation changes is sometimes subject to considerable 
uncertainty.  
 
                                                 
20 The formula shown here is a simplification. The detailed version of the formula is presented in Appendix B. 
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Residual. Changes in the structural revenue ratio not explained by the three factors above are 
attributed to the residual. The residual component is an important element of the proposed 
framework and may contribute in various ways to the analysis of public finances. It may help 
to understand better the past developments, indicating the quantitative importance of particu-
lar unsystematic events. It may show favourable or unfavourable tendencies in specific budg-
etary categories, requiring further analysis. It may also reveal a need to reassess the impact of 
legislation changes or biases in revenue elasticities. Finally, the residual component can be 
used to check the consistency of forecasts, and may thus be useful in evaluating and improv-
ing forecasting methods. 
 
The country analysis of Section 3 shows that residuals are sometimes significant. They occur 
because the underlying “tax model” can only be an approximation of the actual development. 
For example: 
•  The high volatility in profit-related taxes is only partly reflected in the macroeconomic 
base (operating surplus which inter alia does not reflect write-offs on corporate balance 
sheets). This will lead to varying residuals over the years.21 
•  The composition of private consumption might change. With differentiated tax rates, the 
development of VAT revenue would then deviate from that of the macroeconomic base. 
The resulting change of the revenue ratio would be attributed to the residual. 
•  Tax collection lags might vary over time implying residuals that should roughly cancel out 
over several years. 
In many cases, a specific reason for a residual can be given. However, a full explanation of 
past residuals is not always possible ex post because tax revenues are affected by various fac-
tors. In contrast to that, ex ante explanation of residuals in a forecasting exercise should be 
part of the “story” underlying the forecast. 
 
2.2.2 Expenditure developments 
The final part of Table 2 is devoted to the analysis of annual changes in the structural expen-
diture ratios from Table 1. It may be reminded that in the ESCB method for calculating cycli-
cally adjusted balances – like in most of the other approaches – unemployment-related expen-
diture is usually the only expenditure category that is cyclically adjusted. 
 
Except for background data on changes in the number of public employees and in health ex-
penditure, the expenditure side of Table 2 does not deepen the analysis in Table 1. However, 
the breakdown into components already allows the main factors affecting the structural ex-
penditure ratio to be identified and quantified and their effect on the evolution of the fiscal 
balance to be quantified. In this way, the breakdown helps to detect critical developments at 
an early stage. 
 
                                                 
21 The reasons for the generally poor fit of the elasticity (either econometrically estimated or derived from the 
tax rule) used for this category are documented in Bouthevillain et al. (2001). For an estimation of the effects 
of asset price changes on various taxes categories cf. Eschenbach and Schuhknecht (2002). The problem of 
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In principle, it is also possible to give some quantitative indication of the impact of legislation 
changes on the expenditure side. However, in contrast to the revenue side, a comprehensive 
estimation of the impact of legislation changes in the expenditure is not readily available, and 
it would necessarily lack homogeneity across countries. 
 
2.3 The application of the disaggregated framework to fiscal forecasts 
The disaggregated framework presented in this paper is not only useful to analyse past struc-
tural developments in public finances but also helps to assess the consistency and increase the 
transparency of fiscal forecasts. It allows us, in particular, to identify the residuals in the 
breakdown of the changes in the structural revenue ratio which the forecaster should, in prin-
ciple, be able to explain, as they reflect exogenous deviations from the developments that 
would result from the macroeconomic environment, the underlying revenue elasticities and 
the fiscal measures (e.g. on the basis of “expert judgment”). 
 
3. Analysing budgetary developments in individual countries 
The results presented in this section cover the period from 1998 to 2004 for six countries: 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. The first subsection summa-
rises some common features of the public finance developments in the various countries. In 
the following sections a detailed analysis for each country is provided.22 The box “Using the 
disaggregated framework to assess the consistency and increase the transparency of fiscal 
forecasts” illustrates the usefulness of the approach for the assessment of fiscal forecasts with 
the example of Belgium. 
 
3.1 General remarks 
Over the 1998-2004 period, the unadjusted budget balances of the six countries do not show a 
common trend. In three countries (Belgium, Finland and Portugal) the balance ratio improved 
while in the other three countries it worsened (Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). This 
picture changes drastically for the structural budget balance (see the following table). Finland 
is the only country with a significant improvement in its structural budget balance. The 
structural balance in Belgium improved by some 0.8% of GDP – significantly less than the 
unadjusted balance. The budget balance in Portugal worsened by 1.3 percentage points in 
structural terms, while improving by 0.7 percent of GDP in nominal terms. 
 
The development of structural primary balances gives an even worse picture of budgetary 
developments as favourable refinancing conditions reduced interest payments as a percentage 
of trend GDP in all countries between 1997 and 2004, despite diverging debt developments. 
In all countries except Finland the structural primary balance ratio clearly worsened. The 
deterioration is particularly sizeable in Italy and the Netherlands, reaching nearly 6 and 4 
percentage points of trend GDP respectively. 
                                                 
22 Adjusted revenue and expenditure ratios can be found in the tables of Appendix A.3. 
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Changes in structural fiscal components – summary of country results (as a percentage of trend GDP)
1)
Belgium 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Balance 1.2 -0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.2  -0.6  0.6 0.8
   Interest payments -0.4  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  -0.7  -0.5  -0.5  -2.9 
Primary balance 0.8 -0.9  0.1 -0.2  -0.9  -1.1  0.1 -2.1 
Total revenue 0.4 -0.3  0.1 -0.0  0.1 -0.6  0.2 -0.1 
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.4 -0.3  -0.1  -0.3  0.2 -0.5  0.3 -0.3 
   Non-tax-related revenue
2) 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.2
Total primary expenditure  -0.4  0.6 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.2 2.0
   Social payments  -0.2  0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 1.1
   Subsidies 0.0 0.1 -0.1  0.0 -0.1  0.1 0.0 0.1
   Compensation of employees -0.1  0.2 -0.0  0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.2  0.3
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 -0.1  -0.0  0.4
   Government investment -0.1  0.3 0.0 -0.2  -0.1  -0.0  0.1 0.0
   Other
3) 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1  0.0 -0.0  0.1 0.0
Finland 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Balance 1.8 0.4 4.8 -1.6 0.2 -2.1  -0.6 2.9
   Interest payments -0.6  -0.5  -0.2  -0.2  -0.6  -0.2  -0.1  -2.4 
Primary balance 1.2 -0.1  4.6 -1.7  -0.4  -2.3  -0.7  0.6
Total  revenue -1.1  -0.5  2.3 -2.7  0.3 -1.5 -0.6 -3.8 
   Taxes and social contributions overall -0.7  0.1 1.3 -2.6  0.3 -1.4  -0.6  -3.5 
   Non-tax-related revenue
2) -0.5  -0.6  1.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 
Total primary expenditure  -2.3  -0.4  -2.3  -0.9  0.7 0.8 0.1 -4.3 
   Social payments  -1.1  -0.1  -1.4  -0.5  0.3 0.2 -0.0  -2.7 
   Subsidies -0.2  -0.1  0.0 -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.6 
   Compensation of employees -0.5  -0.1  -0.4  -0.2  0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.8 
   Intermediate consumption -0.3  0.1 -0.2  -0.2  0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2
   Government investment -0.3  -0.1  -0.2  0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1  -0.3 
   Other
3) 0.1 -0.0 -0.1  -0.0  -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Germany 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Balance 0.2 0.4 -0.2 -1.8 -0.5  0.2 0.3 -1.4 
   Interest payments -0.0  -0.2  0.1 -0.1  -0.2  0.0 -0.1  -0.5 
Primary balance 0.2 0.2 -0.1  -1.9  -0.7  0.2 0.2 -1.9 
Total  revenue 0.1 0.6 0.4 -2.0 -0.8 -0.3 -1.1 -3.1 
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.1 0.6 0.5 -2.0  -0.7  -0.2  -0.8  -2.5 
   Non-tax-related revenue
2) -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 
Total primary expenditure  -0.1  0.3 0.5 -0.1  -0.2  -0.5  -1.3  -1.2 
   Social payments  -0.1  0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 -0.1  -0.6  0.2
   Subsidies 0.0 -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.5 
   Compensation of employees -0.2  -0.1  -0.0  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.9 
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.2 -0.1  0.0 0.1 -0.1  -0.1  0.0
   Government investment -0.0  0.1 -0.1  -0.0  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.4 
   Other
3) 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.3
Italy 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Balance -0.2 1.5 -0.5  -2.0  -0.2  -0.6  0.5 -1.5 
   Interest payments -1.3  -1.5  -0.2  0.1 -0.7  -0.6  -0.2  -4.4 
Primary balance -1.5  -0.0  -0.7  -1.9  -0.9  -1.1  0.3 -5.9 
Total  revenue -1.3  0.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.8 -1.1 -0.1 -4.2 
   Taxes and social contributions overall -1.4  -0.2  -0.1  -0.7  -0.6  -0.6  -0.2  -3.8 
   Non-tax-related revenue
2) 0.1 0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.1  -0.5 0.1 -0.3 
Total primary expenditure  0.2 0.0 0.3 1.5 0.2 0.1 -0.4  1.8
   Social payments  -0.2  -0.1  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.6
   Subsidies 0.0 -0.1  -0.0  0.0 -0.1  -0.0  -0.1  -0.3 
   Compensation of employees -0.9  -0.0  0.1 0.2 -0.0  0.1 -0.1  -0.6 
   Intermediate consumption 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1  0.1 -0.2  0.2
   Government investment 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7
   Other
3) 1.1 0.0 -0.2 0.8 0.1 -0.3  -0.3 1.1
The Netherlands 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Balance -0.5 1.0 0.3 -2.6  -1.8  0.3 2.0 -1.3 
   Interest payments -0.3  -0.3  -0.6  -0.5  -0.4  -0.2  -0.1  -2.4 
Primary balance -0.8  0.7 -0.3  -3.1  -2.2  0.1 1.9 -3.7 
Total revenue -0.7  1.3 -0.2  -1.9  -1.7  0.1 1.4 -1.7 
   Taxes and social contributions overall -0.4  1.4 -0.4  -2.6  -1.3  0.3 1.4 -1.6 
   Non-tax-related revenue
2) -0.3  -0.1  0.2 0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.0 -0.1 
Total primary expenditure  0.1 0.7 0.1 1.2 0.5 0.0 -0.6  2.0
   Social payments  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.0  0.3 0.2 -0.1  -0.2 
   Subsidies -0.2  0.1 -0.1  -0.0  -0.0  -0.1  0.0 -0.2 
   Compensation of employees 0.0 0.2 -0.1  -0.1  0.1 0.1 -0.0  0.2
   Intermediate consumption 0.1 0.3 -0.0  0.8 0.1 -0.0  -0.1  1.1
   Government investment 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.2  -0.3  0.3
   Other
3) 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.8
Portugal 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Balance -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 0.9 0.0 0.2 -1.3 
   Interest payments -0.7  -0.2  0.0 -0.0  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -1.4 
Primary balance -0.8  -0.8  -0.8  -1.1  0.8 -0.2  0.2 -2.7 
Total revenue 0.0 0.9 -0.3  -0.5  0.6 0.2 0.5 1.3
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.1 0.7 0.7 -0.6  0.1 0.0 0.9 1.9
   Non-tax-related revenue
2) -0.1 0.2 -1.0 0.1 0.5 0.2 -0.4  -0.6 
Total primary expenditure  0.8 1.6 0.5 0.7 -0.2  0.4 0.3 4.1
   Social payments  0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 1.4 0.6 4.4
   Subsidies 0.2 0.2 -0.6  0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
   Compensation of employees 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.1 -0.8  0.0 1.2
   Intermediate consumption -0.0  0.4 0.3 -0.1  -0.1  -0.7  0.1 -0.1 
   Government investment -0.3  0.3 -0.3  0.1 -0.4  -0.3  -0.0  -1.0 
   Other
3) 0.2 -0.4 -0.3  -0.3  -0.2 0.6 -0.4  -0.8 
1 Increasing +, decreasing -. –  2 Other current transfers receivable, sales and total capital revenue. – 3 Other current transfers payable, other net 
acquisitions of non-financial assets and capital transfers.
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In Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands both revenue and expenditure contributed to the dete-
rioration of the fiscal balance. In Germany the large deterioration in revenue was partially 
offset by the decline in the structural primary expenditure ratio while the opposite was true for 
Portugal. 
 
The breakdown of the change in taxes and social contributions into different components 
highlights important determinants of the change in the structural revenue ratio. Declining 
structural revenue ratios were mostly due to tax reductions. As a common feature, negative 
influences from legislation affected (in many cases to a considerable extent) direct taxes pay-
able by households and social contributions. In a majority of countries, these were partly off-
set by sizeable increases in indirect taxes. Owing to progressive income taxation the positive 
fiscal drag in direct taxes payable by households is generally sizeable. The picture for the 
effect of decoupling of macroeconomic bases from GDP is mixed. At the extremes, this fac-
tor clearly contributes to a deterioration of the structural revenue ratio owing to the slow trend 
growth in compensation of employees in Germany over the 1998-2004 period, while in the 
Netherlands strong employment growth and substantial wage increases mostly in the period 
from 1998 to 2002 led to a significantly positive contribution of the decoupling. 
 
There are sometimes considerable residual changes in the revenue ratio. In particular, this is 
the case for direct taxes payable by corporations and taxes on capital income included in di-
rect taxes payable by households. This reflects the difficulty to define appropriate tax bases 
and elasticities for these taxes, partly because they are often collected with time lags of vary-
ing length. Significant positive residuals up to 2000 and negative residuals between 2001 and 
2003 are common to Finland, Germany and Italy and reflect the boom and bust, in particular, 
on the stock market during the reporting period. Negative residuals in VAT development – 
another factor shared by most countries – can partly be attributed to changes in the compo-
sition of private consumption and to tax fraud and evasion. 
 
On the expenditure side, an increase in the structural ratio of social payments to GDP con-
tributed significantly to the deterioration in a majority of countries. Here, old-age and health-
care-related expenditure were particularly relevant. Compensation of employees increased as 
a percentage to trend GDP in Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal and decreased in Finland 
and Germany. In Italy, this budgetary category remained broadly stable, notwithstanding a 
significant increase in public employment.23 Also, the development in the other, quantitatively 









                                                 
23 The decline in compensation of public employees for Italy entirely reflects the impact of the 1998 reform, 
which substituted social security contributions with a new tax (IRAP). 
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 579
January 2006 
 
Using the disaggregated framework to assess the consistency and increase the transparency of 
fiscal forecasts – the example of Belgium 
The usefulness of the disaggregated framework for fiscal forecasts is illustrated for the Autumn 2005 
projections for Belgium documented in the National Bank of Belgium’s Economic Review (IV, 
2005).24 According to these projections, the balanced budget for general government attained in 2004 
would be maintained in 2005 but turn into a significant deficit of 0.4% of GDP by 2006. This would be 
due partly to the reduced impact of temporary measures from 0.8% of GDP in 2004 to 0.5% of GDP in 
2006 and the projected minor worsening in the economic environment, with the cyclical component 
deteriorating slightly by some 0.1% of GDP. The structural balance, which is corrected for these ele-
ments, is estimated to have improved by 0.5% of GDP in 2005 but is projected to worsen by the same 
amount in 2006. Since the ratio of interest charges to trend GDP would shed a further 0.7 percentage 
point in this period, the structural primary balance ratio is projected to drop by an additional 0.7 per-
centage point. This marked loosening of structural fiscal policy, which would be concentrated in 2006, 
is due to both revenue-side and expenditure-side developments. 
The structural revenue ratio would edge up in 2005 but drop to a larger extent in 2006, reflecting the 
structural changes in taxes and social contributions and a minor increase in non-tax revenue over the 
2005-2006 period. 
The 2005 increase in the ratio of taxes and social contributions to trend GDP, by around 0.2 percentage 
point, is entirely due to the positive impact of the residual. The impact of legislation changes would be 
neutral as indirect tax hikes – mainly affecting mineral oils and tobacco products – would fully offset 
net reductions in both direct taxes on households (stemming from the additional impact of the gradual 
reform of the personal income tax system on tax settlements) and social contributions. The impact of 
trend decoupling is estimated to be neutral despite the fact that the real trend in the most important tax 
base, i.e. private-sector labour income, continues to lag that of GDP. The impact of this on the struc-
tural revenue ratio is however offset by price effects with the increase in consumer inflation (used to 
deflate labour income) significantly exceeding that in the GDP deflator. The minor positive impact of 
the residual is the net result of a positive residual in corporate taxes and, to a lesser extent, direct taxes 
paid by households, and a negative one in social contributions. The former is related to the fact that in 
the projections account was taken of the fact that, when the projections were finalised, the available 
monthly cash receipts for corporate taxes exhibited growth rates that significantly exceeded the pace 
that was expected on the basis of the macroeconomic parameters despite the absence of revenue-in-
creasing measures.25 The same phenomenon, albeit to a much lesser extent, applied to direct taxes on 
households. The negative residual in social contributions is also due to the information contained in 
cash receipts with the receipts for the first three quarters indicating a growth rate of social contributions 
that was below the one estimated mechanically on the basis of the macroeconomic environment and the 
legislation changes. 
The decline in the structural revenue ratio in 2006, by 0.6 percentage point, can be mainly attributed to 
legislation changes as the further reductions in direct taxes on households (with the tax settlements 
again being lowered by the delayed impact of the gradual reform of the personal income tax system) 
and social contributions are only partly offset by new increases in indirect taxes. The structural revenue 
ratio is also lowered by 0.2 percentage point due to the trend decoupling of tax bases and GDP. The 
latter is primarily due to the fact that weak trend growth of real private-sector labour income reduces 
the structural ratio of direct taxes from households and social contributions with respect to GDP. 
Unlike in 2005 this was not offset by price effects. The overall residual, finally, is zero but this is the 
result of a minor negative residual in indirect taxes and a minor positive one in direct taxes paid by 
corporations. The former could reflect the fact that excise duties only grow in line with real, rather than 
nominal, consumption which mechanically reduces the structural indirect tax ratio. The latter is due to 
the fact that the projections took account of the fact that tax settlements for corporate profits in previ-
ous years are expected to edge up by close to 0.1% of GDP in 2006; this shows up in the residual effect 
                                                 
24 These forecasts were produced in the fall of 2005 as part of a biannual exercise carried out by the Eurosystem central 
banks. They reflect the macroeconomic and budgetary situation as it was known or considered then and only take into 
account fiscal measures that had already been announced or were specified in sufficient detail then. However, new 
information has become available since then and the forecasts are only used for illustrative purposes here. 
25 This could be due to improved tax collection or reduced tax evasion or fraud or could simply suggest that the 
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as the cyclical adjustment does not include a lag structure for this tax category. 
Spending policy would also contribute to the worsening of the structural fiscal stance in the 2005-2006 
period as, corrected for cyclical and temporary elements, primary spending growth would exceed the 
increase in nominal trend GDP. While the indexation effects described in Annex C.1 are neutral in 
2005 they would marginally increase the gap in 2006. Corrected for those effects, structural primary 
expenditure growth is around 0.25 percentage point higher than that of nominal trend GDP in both 
years. Among the expenditure items contributing to this loosening are subsidies, health care spending 
(included in social transfers in kind in the standard table) – albeit to a lesser extent than in previous 
years –, government investment (due to the electoral cycle with the next municipal elections scheduled 
for 2006) and current transfers to the rest of the world (included in “other” expenditure in the standard 
table) partly due to rising payments to the EU.  
Belgium: Changes in structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
1) 
     2005 2006  05-06 
Unadjusted balance
2) 0.0  -0.4  -0.4 
Cyclical component  -0.2   0.1  -0.1 
Temporary measures  -0.4   0.1  -0.3 
Balance  0.5 -0.5    0.0 
Interest payments -0.4  -0.3  -0.7 
   due to changes in average interest rate  -0.2  -0.2  -0.4 
   due to changes in debt level  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2 
Primary balance  0.1  -0.8  -0.7 
Total revenue  0.4  -0.6  -0.2 
   Direct taxes payable by corporations  0.3   0.1   0.4 
      Fiscal drag  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
      Decoupling of base from GDP  0.1   0.1   0.2 
      Legislation changes  0.0   0.0   0.0 
      Residual  0.2   0.1   0.3 
   Direct taxes payable by households 0.0  -0.4  -0.4 
      Fiscal drag  0.0   0.0   0.0 
      Decoupling of base from GDP  0.0  -0.1  -0.2 
      Legislation changes  -0.1  -0.3  -0.5 
      Residual  0.1   0.0   0.1 
      Memo item: included in expenditure
3) 0.0    0.0    0.0 
   Social contributions  -0.3  -0.3  -0.6 
      Fiscal drag  0.0   0.0   0.0 
      Decoupling of base from GDP  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2 
      Legislation changes  -0.2  -0.1  -0.3 
      Residual  -0.1   0.0  -0.1 
      Memo item: included in expenditure
3) 0.0    0.0    0.0 
    Indirect taxes  0.3   0.0   0.3 
      Fiscal drag  0.0   0.0   0.0 
      Decoupling of base from GDP  0.1   0.0   0.0 
      Legislation changes  0.2   0.1   0.4 
      Residual  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
   Taxes and social contributions overall  0.2  -0.6  -0.4 
      Fiscal drag  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
      Decoupling of base from GDP  0.0  -0.2  -0.1 
      Legislation changes  0.0  -0.3  -0.3 
      Residual
4) 0.2    0.0    0.2 
      Memo item: included in expenditure
3) 0.0    0.0    0.0 
   Non-tax-related revenue
5) 0.2  -0.1    0.1 
Total primary expenditure  0.2   0.2   0.4 
    (of which: due to automatic indexation)  (0.0) (-0.1)  (0.0) 
   Social payments  -0.1   0.1  -0.1 
      of which old-age pensions  0.0   0.0   0.0 
      of which unemployment benefits  -0.1   0.0  -0.1 
      of which social transfers in kind  0.0   0.1   0.1 
   Subsidies  0.2   0.1   0.3 
      of which EU
6) 0.0    0.0    0.0 
   Compensation of employees  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
   Intermediate consumption  0.0   0.0   0.0 
   Government investment  0.0   0.1   0.1 
   Other
7)  0.2   0.1    0.2 
      of which EU
8) 0.1    0.0    0.1 
Memorandum  items     
   Health care
9) 0.0    0.1    0.1 
   Trend growth of real GDP  1.9   2.0    
   Change in GDP deflator  2.3   2.4    
   Change in hours worked by public employees  0.6   0.7    
 
  1 In general: increasing +, decreasing -, i.e. balance: improving +, worsening -. – 2 Change in unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary 
measures as percentage of nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the change in the ratio of the adjusted balance to trend nominal GDP might 
deviate slightly from the change in the ratio to nominal GDP of the unadjusted balance less cyclical component less temporary measures. – 3 Fiscal 
drag and decoupling associated with taxes and social contributions paid in the public sector. For social contributions and indirect taxes also the public 
sector residual might be included to fully reflect revenue from the public sector. – 4 Also includes the change in the adjusted ratio of direct taxes not 
payable by corporations/households. – 5 Other current transfers receivable, sales and total capital revenue. – 6 Expenditure paid by the EC budget that 
is spent under category "Subsidies". – 7 Other current transfers payable, other net acquisitions of non-financial assets and capital transfers. – 8 Ex-
penditure paid by the EC budget that is not spent under category "Other". – 9 Social benefits, social transfers in kind and other current transfers that 
can be allocated to the function of the provision of public health care services. 
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3.2 Belgium 
From 1997 to 2004 general government improved its budget balance by some 2% of GDP.26 
This was partly due to a better cyclical environment, which explains around 0.4 percentage 
point of the change, and to a larger extent to a favourable contribution of temporary measures, 
that had marginally worsened the 1997 balances but improved them by about 0.8% of GDP in 
2004. The structural deficit, i.e. the deficit corrected for cyclical influences and temporary 
measures, was cut from 1.4% of trend GDP in 1997 to 0.7% of trend GDP in 2004 while it 
approached the zero mark in 1998. 
 
This improvement is due to the substantial fall in interest charges – attributable to both the 
trend reduction in the debt ratio and the decrease of the implicit interest rate on public debt – 
that was however largely offset by the strong decline, by more than 2% of trend GDP, in the 
structural primary surplus. This is almost entirely due to expenditure developments as the 
structural revenue ratio declined only marginally. 
 
The structural revenue ratio has shed only 0.1 percentage point in the 1998-2004 period. The 
minor increase in non-tax-related revenue as a percentage of trend GDP was more than off-
set by a decrease in the structural tax pressure. The latter is caused by the net impact of legis-
lation changes and the unfavourable decoupling effect, i.e. the trend decline of the macroeco-
nomic bases for the most important taxes with respect to GDP. Those two elements were 
however partly compensated by favourable residuals, i.e. the change in the structural tax ratio 
that cannot be traced back to the factors explicitly identified in the legislation changes, de-
coupling and fiscal drag. 
 
Legislation changes reduced the structural government revenue ratio by around 1.1 percent-
age point in the 1998-2004 period. As both the previous and the present government specifi-
cally aimed at reducing the tax pressure on labour in order to increase employment, direct 
taxes on households and social contributions saw significant tax cuts (of 0.8% of trend GDP 
in both cases). Direct taxes on households were negatively affected by the stepwise removal 
of the complementary crisis contribution and the gradual reform of the personal income tax 
system (the impact of which will continue to grow until 2007). Cuts in social security contri-
butions mainly pertained to employers’ contributions and to a lesser extent to employees’ 
contributions. These tax cuts were however partly offset by several increases in indirect taxes 
(mainly on tobacco, mineral oils and financial products), which pushed up the revenue ratio 
by around 0.5 percentage point between 1997 and 2004. 
 
The trend decoupling of tax bases from GDP also weighed on revenue developments in that 
period. Detailed calculations show that this is primarily due to a marked divergence between 
real private-sector tax bases, especially real private-sector labour income, and GDP. The con-
tribution of both public-sector components of tax bases considered in the ESCB cyclical-ad-
justment methodology (public-sector wages and indirect taxes paid by government entities) 
 
                                                 
26 This section is based on the national accounts data and projections available at the end of November 2005. 
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Belgium
Table 2: Changes in structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
Increasing +, decreasing - 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Unadjusted balance
1) 1.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 2.1
Cyclical component 0.1 0.7 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.4
Temporary measures 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.6 -0.2 1.0 -0.5 0.9
Balance 1.2 -0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 0.6 0.8
Interest payments -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -2.9
   due to changes in average interest rate -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.2 -0.2 -1.2
   due to changes in debt level -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -1.7
Primary balance 0.8 -0.9 0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -1.1 0.1 -2.1
Total revenue 0.4 -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.1
   Direct taxes payable by corporations 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.3
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
      Legislation changes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Residual 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.5
   Direct taxes payable by households -0.1 -0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
      Legislation changes 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.8
      Residual 0.0 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
   Social contributions 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4
      Legislation changes 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8
      Residual 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.1
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
    Indirect taxes -0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2
      Legislation changes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5
      Residual 0.0 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.5 0.3 -0.3
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.5 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7
      Legislation changes 0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -1.1
      Residual
3) 0.6 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.7 -0.1 0.6 1.6
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
   Non-tax-related revenue
4) 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2
      of which EU
5)
Total primary expenditure -0.4 0.6 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.2 2.0
    (of which: due to automatic indexation)
10) (-0.1) (0.1) (-0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (-0.1) (-0.2) (-0.1)
   Social payments -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 1.1
      of which old-age pensions -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
      of which unemployment benefits 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
      of which social transfers in kind 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.2
   Subsidies 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
      of which EU
6) -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
   Compensation of employees -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.3
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.4
   Government investment -0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
   Other
7) 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
      of which EU
8) 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3
Memorandum items
   Health care
9) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.9
   Trend growth of real GDP 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9
   Change in GDP deflator 1.8 0.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.3
   Change in public employees 1.6 2.4 0.5 0.4 2.0 1.7 1.1
1 Change in unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures as percentage of nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the 
change in the ratio of the adjusted balance to trend nominal GDP might deviate slightly from the change in the ratio to nominal GDP of the 
unadjusted balance less cyclical component less temporary measures. –  2 Fiscal drag and decoupling associated with taxes and social 
contributions paid in the public sector. For social contributions and indirect taxes also the public sector residual might be included to fully reflect 
revenue from public sector. – 3 Also includes the change in the adjusted ratio of direct taxes not by corporations/households. – 4 Other current 
transfers receivable, sales and total capital revenue. – 5 Net receipts from EC budget if country is a net recepient from EC budget. Empty if country 
is net payer to EC budget. – 6 Expenditure paid by EC budget that is spent under category "Subsidies". – 7 Other current transfers payable,
other net acquisitions of non-financial assets and capital transfers. – 8 If country is a net payer to EC budget: net payments to EC budget less 
expenditure paid by EC budget that is not spent under category "Other". If country is a net recipient from EC budget: expenditure paid by EC budget 
that is spent under category "Other". – 9 Social benefits, social transfers in kind and other current transfers that can be allocated into the function of 
the provision of public health care services. – 10 For price effects: see Appendix C.1 for documentation.
Note: Due to rounding there might be deviations between aggregate numbers and the sum of individual numbers.
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and pure price effects27 is relatively small and actually slightly reduces the overall decoupling. 
For instance, real private-sector labour income, the most important tax base for government 
revenue, posted an annual trend increase of 1.5% between 1997 and 2004 while trend activity 
grew by some 2.1% a year in the same period. 
 
The fiscal drag was relatively neutral throughout the period under consideration as the posi-
tive drag in direct taxes on households (due to the progressive nature of the personal income 
tax system) was roughly offset by the negative effect of the econometrically estimated elas-
ticities for both indirect taxes and corporate taxes being smaller than one. 
 
Finally, residuals were, on average, positive in the 1998-2004 period and increased the reve-
nue ratio by around 1.6 percentage points. Residuals increase direct taxes on corporations and 
social contributions and reduce indirect taxes. Relative to the size of the revenue item the 
largest residuals can be found in direct taxes on corporations which is not unexpected in view 
of the generally poor fit of the elasticity (either econometrically estimated or derived from the 
tax rule) used for this category. Large positive residuals for social contributions could be re-
lated to an overestimation of the impact of the frequent legislation changes. The large nega-
tive residual for indirect taxes, finally, mainly derives from the substantial 2001 VAT revenue 
shortfall which is partly related to a hike in tax reimbursements (for exports and investments) 
but not yet fully explained. 
 
The contribution of primary expenditure to the worsening of the structural primary surplus 
was much larger than that of government revenue as, corrected for cyclical influences and 
temporary measures, the primary expenditure ratio grew by 2 percentage points. This is 
mainly due to the strong increase in social transfers in kind (primarily health care spending for 
which a real growth norm of 4.5% – i.e. far above the trend activity growth – currently ap-




There are no temporary measures over the reporting period in Finland; hence structural and 
cyclically adjusted values are equal. 
 
When analysing changes in structural revenue and expenditure ratios it should be kept in mind 
that the early years of the period were very special in the Finnish economy. The economy was 
still recovering from the huge recession of the early 1990s. While the private sector was re-
bounding from the previous slump and already growing fast, consolidation needs and spend-
ing controls dominated public sector developments. Additionally, the global ICT boom had a 
huge impact on the economy in 1998-2001. 
 
                                                 
27 Price developments lead to a decoupling of government revenue from trend GDP growth if the evolution of 
the tax base deflators deviates from that of the GDP deflator. 
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Finland
Table 2: Changes in structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
Increasing +, decreasing - 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Unadjusted balance
1) 2.9 0.5 4.9 -1.9 -0.9 -2.0 -0.5 3.1
Cyclical component 1.1 0.2 0.3 -0.5 -1.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
Temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Balance 1.8 0.4 4.8 -1.6 0.2 -2.1 -0.6 2.9
Interest payments -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -2.4
   due to changes in average interest rate -0.4 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -1.7
   due to changes in debt level -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.7
Primary balance 1.2 -0.1 4.6 -1.7 -0.4 -2.3 -0.7 0.6
Total revenue -1.1 -0.5 2.3 -2.7 0.3 -1.5 -0.6 -3.8
   Direct taxes payable by corporations 0.8 0.2 1.4 -1.5 -0.1 -0.8 0.1 0.2
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
      Legislation changes 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
      Residual 0.8 0.2 1.3 -1.5 -0.1 -0.8 0.1 0.0
   Direct taxes payable by households -0.7 -0.2 1.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -1.1
      Fiscal drag 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.1
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.6
      Legislation changes 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -2.4
      Residual -0.3 -0.1 1.2 0.1 0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.7
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.7
   Social contributions -0.5 0.0 -0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -1.6
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.5
      Legislation changes 0.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -1.1
      Residual -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.5 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.7
    Indirect taxes -0.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.5 0.3 0.2 -0.2 -1.0
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
      Legislation changes 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0
      Residual -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -1.1
   Taxes and social contributions overall -0.7 0.1 1.3 -2.6 0.3 -1.4 -0.6 -3.5
      Fiscal drag 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.1
      Decoupling of base from GDP -1.2 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.9
      Legislation changes 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -1.1 -0.8 -0.5 -0.6 -3.4
      Residual
3) 0.2 -0.2 1.8 -1.4 0.6 -1.2 -0.1 -0.5
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.1 -1.4
   Non-tax-related revenue
4) -0.5 -0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2
      of which EU
5) 0
Total primary expenditure -2.3 -0.4 -2.3 -0.9 0.7 0.8 0.1 -4.3
   Social payments -1.1 -0.1 -1.4 -0.5 0.3 0.2 0.0 -2.7
      of which old-age pensions -0.4 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.8
      of which unemployment benefits -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.2
      of which social transfers in kind 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
   Subsidies -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6
      of which EU
6) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Compensation of employees -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.8
   Intermediate consumption -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2
   Government investment -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3
   Other
7) 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
      of which EU
8) 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0
Memorandum items
   Health care
9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
   Trend growth of real GDP 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.1 2.9
   Change in GDP deflator 3.5 -0.2 3.2 3.0 1.3 -0.2 0.8
   Change in public employees -0.3 0.5 1.1 1.4 2.2 0.9 0.5
1 Change in unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures as percentage of nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the 
change in the ratio of the adjusted balance to trend nominal GDP might deviate slightly from the change in the ratio to nominal GDP of the 
unadjusted balance less cyclical component less temporary measures. –  2 Fiscal drag and decoupling associated with taxes and social 
contributions paid in the public sector. For social contributions and indirect taxes also the public sector residual might be included to fully reflect 
revenue from public sector. – 3 Also includes the change in the adjusted ratio of direct taxes not by corporations/households. – 4 Other current 
transfers receivable, sales and total capital revenue. – 5 Net receipts from EC budget if country is a net recepient from EC budget. Empty if country 
is net payer to EC budget. – 6 Expenditure paid by EC budget that is spent under category "Subsidies". – 7 Other current transfers payable,
other net acquisitions of non-financial assets and capital transfers. – 8 If country is a net payer to EC budget: net payments to EC budget less 
expenditure paid by EC budget that is not spent under category "Other". If country is a net recipient from EC budget: expenditure paid by EC budget 
that is spent under category "Other". – 9 Social benefits, social transfers in kind and other current transfers that can be allocated into the function of 
the provision of public health care services.
Note: Due to rounding there might be deviations between aggregate numbers and the sum of individual numbers.
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The general government balance increased by 3.1 percentage points to 1.9% between 1997 
and 2004.28 Overall, cyclical influences were only of minor importance; also, the structural 
fiscal balance saw a 2.9 percentage point improvement, from a deficit of -1.1% of nominal 
trend GDP in 1997 to a surplus of 1.8% in 2004. The structural improvement was mainly 
driven by the steady decrease in interest payments in relation to the nominal trend GDP, 
amounting to -2.4 percentage points between 1997 and 2004. Two-thirds of the cumulated 
decrease in the ratio was due to the decrease in average implicit interest rate. The implicit 
interest rate on general government debt decreased from 8.0% in 1997 to 4.3% in 2004. The 
rest of the decrease in the ratio was due to the very moderate increase in the amount of debt. 
 
The structural primary surplus ratio increased by 0.6 percentage point, from 3.2% of nomi-
nal trend GDP in 1997 to 3.7% in 2004. This improvement was totally attributable to the con-
siderable decrease in the structural primary expenditure ratio; the -3.8 percentage point de-
crease in the structural revenue ratio was more than compensated for by the -4.3 percentage 
point decrease in the structural primary expenditure ratio between 1997 and 2004. 
 
The structural total revenue ratio decreased by -3.8 percentage point between 1997 and 2004. 
The decrease was due to three factors: the tax cuts, the fact that tax bases increased on aver-
age slower than the nominal trend GDP and the impact of special events. By contrast, fiscal 
drag clearly contributed to the increase in the revenue ratio and compensated the decrease in 
the structural total revenue ratio. 
 
The contribution of tax cuts amounted to -3.4 percentage points between 1997 and 2004. Cuts 
in income taxes and social contribution rates in the years 2001 to 2004 played a decisive role. 
 
The contribution of fiscal drag amounted to 1.1 percentage point between 1997 and 2004, 
reflecting the highly progressive taxation of wages. Since profit-related and consumption-re-
lated taxation and social security contributions are strictly proportional, fiscal drag does not 
exist under these revenue categories. 
 
The contribution of the decoupling of tax bases from GDP amounted to -0.9 percentage point 
between 1997 and 2004. Though limited, the contribution is still visible in all revenue 
categories. The negative annual contributions concentrated on the early years of the period – 
especially on 1998 – and were particularly high under wage-related revenue categories. They 
primarily reflected two factors. Firstly, average growth in public sector wages remained 
below nominal trend GDP growth between 1997 and 2001, while growth in operating surplus 
and private sector wages exceeded nominal trend GDP growth slightly. Therefore, if public 
sector wages are excluded, the contribution of the decoupling in wage-related revenue 
categories is close to zero. Secondly, the large negative overall contribution in 1998 mainly 
reflects the unequal composition of nominal GDP growth in the earlier years of the 1990s 
resulting from the strong growth of (low tax yielding) nominal operating surplus and the 
comparatively weaker growth of (high tax yielding) nominal compensation of employees 
(both private and public). This development was partially compensated for by reverse 
developments in subsequent years. 
                                                 
28 This section is based on the national accounts data and projections available at the end of May 2005. 
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The residual contributed -0.5 percentage point to the decrease in the structural total revenue 
ratio. Annual residuals under direct taxes payable by corporations and social contributions add 
up to zero between 1997 and 2004. This is plausible because over a longer period of time the 
impacts of unsystematic developments should cancel out each other. By contrast, the residuals 
under direct taxes payable by households and indirect taxes add up to 0.7% and -1.1% of 
nominal trend GDP respectively. The reasons for these large cumulative residuals are unclear 
and require further analysis. 
 
The annual contributions of residuals to the changes in structural total revenue ratio were 
fairly limited except from an anomalous impact in the years 2000 and 2001. It is, on the one 
hand, attributable to the exceptionally large 1998-2000 revenue gains from taxes on stock 
option income and capital gains during the ICT boom phase and the following stock price 
bubble. Consequently, corporations and households paid more direct taxes than explainable 
by the increase in their respective tax bases. However, it should be kept in mind that large 
changes in residuals under the profit-related taxes also reflect the fact that operating surplus is 
a bad proxy for the tax base and the complex system of e.g. the deduction of the previous 
losses from current and future profits makes the annual change in operating surplus an even 
worse proxy for the annual change in profit-related tax revenue. 
 
Because of the lagged collection of taxes on stock option income, capital gains and 
unforeseen corporate profits of 1998-2000, the exceptional revenue from direct taxes payable 
by corporations and households gradually faded away in 2001-2003. In addition, a one-off 
extraordinary booking, shifting EUR 500 million (0.35% of nominal trend GDP) worth of 
revenue from 2001 to 2002, increases the negative residual of direct taxes payable by 
corporations in 2001 and decreases that in 2002. 
 
The structural primary expenditure ratio decreased by -4.3 percentage points between 1997 
and 2004. The decrease occurred in its entirety already in 1998-2001 and resulted from the 
combination of a limited increase in nominal primary expenditure and a rapid increase in 
nominal trend GDP. Later, as a result of accelerating nominal primary expenditure growth and 
decelerating trend GDP growth, the structural primary expenditure ratio clearly increased. 
However, the considerable decrease in interest payments constrained the increase in the 
structural total expenditure ratio. 
 
The average annual increase in nominal trend GDP amounted to 6.0% in 1998-2001. In 1998, 
2000 and 2001, when the decrease in the total expenditure ratio was especially rapid, nominal 
trend GDP grew at an average rate of nearly 7%. At the same time, the primary expenditure 
growth was subdued; in 1998-2000 it increased on average by only 2.4% annually in nominal 
terms and in real terms it remained unchanged. In 2001 nominal primary expenditure growth 
almost doubled, but it was still outweighed by the rapid increase in nominal trend GDP, and 
the primary expenditure ratio kept declining. The picture changed completely in 2002-2003 
when nominal primary expenditure growth accelerated further to an annual average of 5.5% 
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Primary spending growth was mainly nurtured by growth in social payments, compensation 
of employees and intermediate consumption accelerating from 2001 onwards, after a period 
with only moderate increases or decreases. For example, unemployment-related expenditure 
decreased year after year in 1998-2001 as a result of the shrinking number of unemployed. It 
clearly increased thereafter, however, because more money was allocated to active labour 
market measures and unemployment benefits were raised. On the other hand, the growth of 
social transfers in kind29 was clearly higher than that of nominal trend GDP throughout the 
period. Finally, the ratio of subsidies decreased steadily year after year reflecting the fact that, 
apart from the level shift in 2000, their annual growth was zero. 
 
3.4 Germany 
Between 1997 and 2004, the general government budget balance ratio deteriorated by 1 
percentage point.30 Taking into account the positive cyclical impact of 0.4 percentage point 
and the zero impact of temporary measures, the structural balance ratio fell by 1.4 percentage 
points, reaching -3.4% in 2004. Owing to the significant drop in the average interest on 
government debt, the interest expenditure ratio declined by 0.5 percentage point despite a 
distinct rise in the debt ratio. The structural primary balance as a percentage of trend GDP 
decreased by 1.9 percentage points to -0.6%. Overall, the unfavourable development of public 
finances was due mainly to weak revenue side developments, while primary expenditure, in 
particular in 2003 and 2004, contributed noticeably to consolidation. 
 
The structural revenue ratio fell by 3.1 percentage points to 43.2% in 2004 in the 1998-2004 
period. Given progressive taxation, the observation period saw a fiscal drag of 0.7 percentage 
point overall. It was much weaker than in earlier years in the light of low nominal growth 
rates. The positive influence of fiscal drag was more than offset by the fact that, adjusted for 
cyclical influences, compensation of employees – the macroeconomic bases of wage taxes 
and social contributions – grew much more weakly than nominal GDP in the 1998-2004 
period. Consequently, wage taxes and social contributions grew more slowly than GDP in 
structural terms, so that the structural revenue ratio declined. Overall, the impact of the 
decoupling of macro bases from GDP amounted to -1.4 percentage points. 
 
Tax measures and legislation changes concerning social security funds, on balance, had a 
slightly negative influence on the revenue ratio. On the one hand, there was a distinct 
reduction in the direct tax burden (-1.6% of GDP); here the first two stages of the tax reform, 
which took effect in 2001 and 2004, played a particular role. That contrasted, however, with a 
perceptible rise in indirect taxes (+1.5% of GDP). This was, in particular, the result of the 
sharp hike in energy taxation in order to contribute to the financing of the pension insurance 
in the context of the “ecological tax reform”. 
                                                 
29 To some extent, social transfers in kind resemble health care expenditure. Here, health care expenditure 
consists of social benefits, social transfers in kind and other current transfers that can be allocated to the 
function of the provision of public health care services. 
30 This section is based on the national accounts data and projections available at the end of November 2005. 
26
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 579
January 2006 
Germany
Table 2: Changes in structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
Increasing +, decreasing - 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Unadjusted balance
1) 0.5 0.7 2.8 -4.1 -0.9 -0.3 0.3 -1.0
Cyclical component 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.4
Temporary measures 0.0 0.0 2.4 -2.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Balance 0.2 0.4 -0.2 -1.8 -0.5 0.2 0.3 -1.4
Interest payments 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.5
   due to changes in average interest rate -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8
   due to changes in debt level 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3
Primary balance 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -1.9 -0.7 0.2 0.2 -1.9
Total revenue 0.1 0.6 0.4 -2.0 -0.8 -0.3 -1.1 -3.1
   Direct taxes payable by corporations 0.1 0.2 0.2 -1.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 -0.3
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Legislation changes 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1
      Residual 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.6 -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.3
   Direct taxes payable by households 0.2 0.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8
      Fiscal drag 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.4
      Legislation changes -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -1.5
      Residual 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.2
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 0
   Social contributions -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -1.5
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -1.0
      Legislation changes 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1
      Residual -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4
    Indirect taxes 0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
      Legislation changes 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 1.5
      Residual 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -1.0
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.1 0.6 0.5 -2.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.8 -2.5
      Fiscal drag 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -1.4
      Legislation changes 0.1 0.5 -0.2 -1.1 0.7 0.4 -0.5 -0.1
      Residual
3) 0.4 0.2 0.5 -0.9 -1.2 -0.5 -0.2 -1.7
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4
   Non-tax-related revenue
4) -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6
      of which EU
5)
Total primary expenditure -0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -1.3 -1.2
   Social payments -0.1 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 0.2
      of which old-age pensions 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.5
      of which unemployment benefits -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
      of which social transfers in kind 0.0 0 . 00 . 20 . 10 . 0 0.0 -0.3 0.0
   Subsidies 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5
      of which EU
6) 0 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 0
   Compensation of employees -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.9
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
   Government investment 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4
   Other
7) 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.3
      of which EU
8) 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Memorandum items
   Health care
9) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2
   Trend growth of real GDP 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0
   Change in GDP deflator 0.6 0.3 -0.7 1.2 1.5 1.0 0.8
   Change in public employees -1.8 -1.5 -1.0 -2.1 -0.9 -0.8 -1.0
Note: Due to rounding there might be deviations between aggregate numbers and the sum of individual numbers.
1 Change in unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures as percentage of nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the 
change in the ratio of the adjusted balance to trend nominal GDP might deviate slightly from the change in the ratio to nominal GDP of the 
unadjusted balance less cyclical component less temporary measures. –  2 Fiscal drag and decoupling associated with taxes and social 
contributions paid in the public sector. For social contributions and indirect taxes also the public sector residual might be included to fully reflect 
revenue from public sector. – 3 Also includes the change in the adjusted ratio of direct taxes not by corporations/households. – 4 Other current 
transfers receivable, sales and total capital revenue. – 5 Net receipts from EC budget if country is a net recepient from EC budget. Empty if country 
is net payer to EC budget. – 6 Expenditure paid by EC budget that is spent under category "Subsidies". – 7 Other current transfers payable,
other net acquisitions of non-financial assets and capital transfers. – 8 If country is a net payer to EC budget: net payments to EC budget less 
expenditure paid by EC budget that is not spent under category "Other". If country is a net recipient from EC budget: expenditure paid by EC budget 
that is spent under category "Other". – 9  Expenditure of the statutory health insurance funds and on health care benefits for civil servants.
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Social contributions and indirect taxes developed considerably less favourably than one would 
expect given the changes in macroeconomic bases, the usual sensitivities and the changes in 
legislation, exerting a significantly negative influence on government revenue. Overall, this 
effect, which is captured in the residual, led to a decrease in the adjusted revenue ratio of 1.7 
percentage points between 1997 and 2004 (see Table 2a, Appendix C.2 for a delineation of 
categories in accordance with the following reasoning). For turnover tax, this is likely to be 
due in part to tax evasion and usage of tax loopholes. Moreover, the composition of private 
consumption may have been shifted to a structure yielding less tax revenue. The negative 
residual for excise taxes is mostly concentrated in 2004 when strong demand reactions to high 
energy prices and the tobacco tax rate increase led to falling demand for mineral oil products 
and taxed cigarettes, which is only partly reflected in the underlying macroeconomic base 
(real private consumption). As regards social contributions, a factor which does much to 
explain the phenomenon is that, owing to the option of leaving the statutory health insurance 
scheme from a certain gross salary on, a considerable number of insured persons left the 
statutory health insurance scheme to join private health insurance plans. Since the drop-outs 
are mostly younger, higher-earning persons with relatively low expenditure risk, the structural 
financial situation of the statutory health insurance schemes deteriorated markedly. The 
residual in profit-related taxes is also negative overall with relatively strong swings between 
1997 and 2004. This is due to the fact that the employed macroeconomic base entrepreneurial 
and investment income is only relatively loosely linked to the development of the true tax 
base over the period (e.g. deduction of depreciations is not taken into account). Moreover, lag 
structures linking revenue to the base are unstable over time.  
 
The ratio of non-tax-related revenue to adjusted GDP went down by 0.6 percentage point 
during the reporting period. About 0.3 percentage point of this fall can be attributed to 
changes in government revenue from sales. Since these are attributable to a significant degree 
to the (statistical) outsourcing of fee budgets (for example in the area of sewage and refuse 
disposal), they are likely to be reflected in a decline in expenditure of similar size. In addition, 
the decrease of Bundesbank profits in 2003 and 2004 is a sizable contributing factor. 
 
The primary expenditure ratio, adjusted for cyclical influences and temporary measures, 
went down by 1.2 percentage points to 43.7% between 1997 and 2004, with the last year 
being the decisive one. The annual average nominal primary expenditure grew below 2%. 
Though this is very moderate by historical standards, the growth in nominal trend GDP, 
which basically defines the scope for a deficit-neutral increase in expenditure, was only 
slightly higher. In 2004, however, despite even lower growth of nominal trend GDP the 
structural primary expenditure ratio fell distinctly, reflecting the restrictive spending stance 
(the health reform in particular). 
 
The fall in the adjusted primary expenditure ratio is due to several, and in some cases oppos-
ing, developments. In particular, the distinct reduction in staff in the public sector (represent-
ing a cumulative 9%) and a wage increase in the public sector which failed to match private 
sector pay hikes led to no more than moderate growth in compensation of employees. Fur-
thermore, a distinct decline in government investment over time also has become apparent, 
reflecting recently mounting strains on municipal budgets. Together with the decline in 
28
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 579
January 2006 
subsidies, these factors contributed a total of about 2 percentage points to consolidation be-
tween 1997 and 2004. Since these expenditure categories can be influenced, for the most part, 
in a discretionary manner and mostly without major legislation changes by the subsectors of 
government, the decrease reflects the restrictive expenditure policy over the period. 
 
The aforementioned positive influence on deficits was offset to a large extent by the increase 
in  social payments (0.2 percentage point) and capital transfers (0.3 percentage point; 
included under “Other” in Table 2). A crucial factor was the strong rise in expenditure on old-
age provision (0.5 percentage point) owing to an increase in old-age pensions as consequence 
of a noticeable rise in the number of retirees and pensioners and the fact that the pension 
burden for former civil servants of the former Postal Services (Post Office, Telekom and 
Postbank) was largely assumed by the Federal Government. The increase in capital transfers 
is mainly attributable to the grant to private home buyers/builders (Eigenheimzulage), which 
has continued to rise owing to the additional generations of recipients entering the system. In 
contrast to earlier years, in 2004 all expenditure categories contributed to consolidation. In 
particular, social payments fell distinctly. First, expenditure on old-age pension grew only 
moderately because the rise in the number of pension payments and the increase of individual 
pensions was moderate. Second, discretionary spending cuts in health care in 2004 (see 
memorandum item of Table 2) contributed considerably to consolidation in this year. 
 
3.5 Italy 
Between 1997 and 2004 the general government balance ratio in Italy showed a limited 
worsening (-0.4% of GDP; Table 2).31 However, excluding the improvement in the cyclical 
conditions registered over the period and the increase in the recourse to temporary measures 
reveals a significant increase in the structural deficit ratio, by 1.5 percentage points, from 
3.3% of trend GDP in 1997 to 4.8%. The increase was limited by the large drop in interest 
payments (4.4% of trend GDP), which largely reflected the reduction in average rates. 
 
The high structural primary surplus achieved in 1997, which allowed Italy to participate in 
the European Monetary Union, almost vanished, declining by 5.9 percentage points to 0.3% 
of trend GDP. The worsening in the structural primary balance was a feature of all years 
except for 1999 and 2004, when the changes were close to zero; over the entire period, two-
thirds of the fall can be attributed to weak revenue developments and one-third to expenditure 
increases.  
 
The structural revenue ratio fell by 4.2 percentage points in the years 1998-2004, to 44.1%. 
Direct taxes on corporations and on households and social security contributions declined, by 
1.9, 1.3 and 2.6 percentage points respectively, while indirect taxes rose by 1.9 percentage 
points. With the exception of direct taxes on households, which remained virtually unaffected, 
these developments were influenced by the 1998 tax reform which introduced a new regional 
tax on productive activities (IRAP). While in official estimates released when the reform was 
introduced, IRAP was expected to have a neutral effect on total revenue, in the legislation 
                                                 
31 This section is based on the national accounts data and projections available at the end of November 2005. 
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Table 2: Changes in structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
Increasing +, decreasing - 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Unadjusted balance
1) -0.2 1.3 1.0 -2.4 0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
Cyclical component 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.6
Temporary measures -0.6 -0.6 1.3 -0.6 0.9 0.5 -0.4 0.5
Balance -0.2 1.5 -0.5 -2.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.5 -1.5
Interest payments -1.3 -1.5 -0.2 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 -4.4
   due to changes in average interest rate -1.1 -1.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -0.1 -3.5
   due to changes in debt level -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.9
Primary balance -1.5 0.0 -0.7 -1.9 -0.9 -1.1 0.3 -5.9
Total revenue -1.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.8 -1.1 -0.1 -4.2
   Direct taxes payable by corporations -1.7 0.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -1.9
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
      Legislation changes -0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -1.3
      Residual -0.8 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.1 0.4 -0.7
   Direct taxes payable by households -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -1.3
      Fiscal drag 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
      Legislation changes 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 -1.8
      Residual -0.3 0.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 -0.7
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 1
   Social contributions -2.7 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 -2.6
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
      Legislation changes -2.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -2.5
      Residual -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) - 0 . 60 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 10 . 0- 0 . 4
    Indirect taxes 3.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 1.9
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
      Legislation changes 2.7 -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.8
      Residual 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.8
   Taxes and social contributions overall -1.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 -3.8
      Fiscal drag 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4
      Legislation changes -0.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.4 0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -2.7
      Residual
3) -0.8 0.0 0.4 -0.6 -1.2 -0.2 0.0 -2.4
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 10 . 00 . 0
   Non-tax-related revenue
4) 0.1 0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.3
      of which EU
5)
Total primary expenditure 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.5 0.2 0.1 -0.4 1.8
   Social payments -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.6
      of which old-age pensions 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4
      of which unemployment benefits -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
      of which social transfers in kind 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6
   Subsidies 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3
      of which EU
6) - 0 . 10 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 0- 0 . 1
   Compensation of employees -0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.6
   Intermediate consumption 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.2
   Government investment 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7
   Other
7) 1.1 0.0 -0.2 0.8 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 1.1
      of which EU
8) 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
Memorandum items
   Health care
9) 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.3 1.1
   Trend growth of real GDP 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1
   Change in GDP deflator 2.7 1.6 2.2 2.6 3.1 2.9 2.6
   Change in public employees -0.9 -0.1 0.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.2
1 Change in unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures as percentage of nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the 
change in the ratio of the adjusted balance to trend nominal GDP might deviate slightly from the change in the ratio to nominal GDP of the 
unadjusted balance less cyclical component less temporary measures. –  2 For direct taxes, decoupling associated with taxes paid by the public 
sector; for indirect taxes (not reported in the table, but included in the memo item referring to the "taxes and social contributions overall") and social 
security contributions, change in the ratio to GDP of, respectively, indirect taxes and employers' contributions paid by the general government to 
itself. – 3 Might also include the change in the adjusted ratio of direct taxes not by corporations/households. – 4 Other current transfers receivable,
sales and total capital revenue. – 5 Net receipts from EC budget if country is a net recepient from EC budget. Empty if country is net payer to EC 
budget. – 6 Expenditure paid by EC budget that is spent under category "Subsidies". – 7 Other current transfers payable, other net acquisitions of 
non-financial assets and capital transfers. – 8 If country is a net payer to EC budget: net payments to EC budget less expenditure paid by EC budget 
that is not spent under category "Other". If country is a net recipient from EC budget: expenditure paid by EC budget that is spent under category 
"Other". – 9 Social benefits, social transfers in kind and other current transfers that can be allocated into the function of the provision of public health 
care services.
Note: Due to rounding there might be deviations between aggregate numbers and the sum of individual numbers. 
effects shown in Table  2 we include a negative impact close to -0.5% of GDP. In our 
assessment, the reform implied reductions in social security contributions (-2.1% of GDP) and 
direct taxes on corporations (-0.9% of GDP), only partly offset by the increase in indirect 
taxes (+2.5%), where the new tax was classified.  
 
Excluding the impact of the IRAP reform, over the period 1998-2004 there were limited 
reductions in indirect taxes and in social security contributions (in each case, around 0.5 
percentage points) and more sizable ones in direct taxes on corporations and on households (1 
and 1.3 percentage points, respectively). The decline in the overall taxes and social security 
contributions ratio (3.8 percentage points) essentially reflected legislation changes (-2.7 
percentage points) and a large residual component (-2.4 percentage points). These factors 
were partly offset by the positive impacts of fiscal drag (0.8 percentage points) and 
decoupling (0.4 percentage points). 
 
Concerning legislation, the changes implemented over the period 1998-2004 are estimated to 
have reduced revenue in 2004 by approximately 2.7% of trend GDP. The largest effect of 
legislation concerned direct taxes on households (-1.8% of trend GDP). Tax reductions were 
sizable in 1999-2000, when the favourable cyclical conditions and economic prospects led the 
Government to use what was called the “growth dividend”, and in 2003-04, when the 
slowdown prompted action aimed at helping the expected recovery. It should be emphasized 
that our assessment of the effects of legislation has to be considered as only broadly 
indicative. Indeed, the effects of a number of measures could not be assessed, lacking 
adequate information. Moreover, in many cases we could not perform an independent 
assessment but had to rely on government estimates. 
 
Concerning the residual component, results for individual years can be partly explained by 
specific factors. The negative value in 1998 (0.8 % of GDP) is related to the reform of the 
taxation on financial assets, whose complexity has made it difficult to evaluate the impact on 
revenue. The reform was partly responsible for the fall in revenue from the withholding tax on 
interest revenue, from 1.8% of GDP in 1997 to 0.9% in 1998. Furthermore, the negative 
impact on revenue of the IRAP reform may have been larger than that included in our 
estimates. The positive residuals in 2000 are connected with the large amount of revenue from 
capital gains collected in that year (0.7% of trend GDP); in the following two years these 
extraordinary revenues vanished, resulting in negative residuals. The 2001-03 period was also 
affected, to an extent difficult to gauge precisely, by tax incentives for investment (Tremonti 
law). The large negative residual in the direct taxes paid by corporation in 2002 seem to 
suggest that our estimates (0.2% of GDP in 2002 and 0.1% in the previous and subsequent 
years) may underestimate the actual loss of receipts related to the incentives. The recourse in 
the years 2001-04 to temporary withholding taxes on extraordinary operations (essentially, 
revaluation of assets and sales of companies) at reduced rates also affected ordinary revenue, 
albeit to an extent which is difficult to measure. These extraordinary taxes, included in the 
temporary measures, cumulatively generated revenue amounting to 1.9% of trend GDP. 
 
The effects of decoupling tax bases from GDP were particularly sizable and negative in 1998. 
In the following years they were initially positive and afterwards close to zero. Over the 
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period 1998-2004 this factor had a positive impact on the dynamics of the revenue ratio, equal 
to 0.4 percentage points. The favourable effect is related to the good performance of 
employment and consumption with respect to GDP.  
 
The structural primary expenditure ratio rose by 1.8 percentage points between 1997 and 
2004. The largest contributions to the increase came from social transfers in kind (0.6 
percentage points), a part of health care included in social payments, and investment (0.7 
percentage points). Overall, health care rose by 1.1 percentage points. The IRAP reform led to 
a reduction in social security contribution rates for public employees which was matched by 
the recording of payments for the new tax: the reform explains 0.7 percentage points of GDP 
of the reduction in compensation of employees and of the increase in the category “other” 
registered in 1998. The cost of public employees, net of the impact of the reform, remained 
broadly stable as a ratio to trend GDP over the entire period, notwithstanding the significant 
increase in their number from 2000 onwards. The cumulative growth in public employment in 
the period 2000-2004 (4 percentage points) largely offset the reduction which had taken place 
in the nineties. 
 
3.6 The Netherlands 
Between 1997 and 2004 the general government balance worsened by 1 percentage point.32 
Over the whole period, the cycle contributed mildly positively to the change in the balance. In 
addition, there was minor recourse to temporary measures in 2004, amounting to 0.2% of 
GDP. Adjusted for these effects, the structural balance ratio worsened by 1.3 percentage 
points to -1.5%. These overall figures mark significantly different developments before and 
after 2001. Up to 2000, the structural general government balance improved, caused by falling 
interest payments. This, in turn, was caused by both lower average interest rates and a falling 
debt ratio. The structural primary surplus worsened slightly. The increase in the structural 
revenue ratio fell short of the increase in the structural primary expenditure ratio. 2001 
marked a turnaround for the Dutch economy, and consequently, for public finances. 
Economic growth slumped and remained below its potential afterwards. This had a major 
impact on public finances, which gradually unveiled only later. Interest payments continued 
to decline, albeit at a more moderate pace as the debt ratio started to increase again. 
Refinancing conditions remained favourable, though. The structural primary balance 
decreased markedly in 2001 and 2002, when both revenue decreased and expenditure 
increased. Starting in 2003, consolidation measures started to take effect. The downward trend 
in the revenue ratio was stopped, while the expenditure ratio began to decrease. As a result, 
the structural primary balance started to improve again. 
 
The structural revenue ratio declined by 3 percentage points between 1997 and 2002. 
Afterwards it increased by 1.5 percentage point. Fiscal drag contributed negatively in all 
years. This was mainly caused by social contributions, which are only levied over the two 
                                                 
32 This section is based on the national accounts data and projections available at the end of November 2005. 
The last revision of national accounts data for the Netherlands covers the years 2001 to 2004. For earlier 
years, no revised data are available yet. For these years, we have linked pre-revision national accounts data 
using growth rates. 
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The Netherlands
Table 2: Changes in structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
Increasing +, decreasing - 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Unadjusted balance
1) 0.3 1.4 1.5 -2.4 -1.7 -1.2 1.1 -1.0
Cyclical component 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.0 -0.2 -1.4 -1.2 0.1
Temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.6 -0.9 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2
Balance -0.5 1.0 0.3 -2.6 -1.8 0.3 2.0 -1.3
Interest payments -0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -2.4
   due to changes in average interest rate 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -1.2
   due to changes in debt level -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -1.1
Primary balance -0.8 0.7 -0.3 -3.1 -2.2 0.1 1.9 -3.7
Total revenue -0.7 1.3 -0.2 -1.9 -1.7 0.1 1.4 -1.7
   Direct taxes payable by corporations 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 0.2 -1.1
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
      Legislation changes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
      Residual 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 0.0 -1.1
   Direct taxes payable by households -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.5
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
      Legislation changes -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.0 -1.1
      Residual -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
   Social contributions -0.2 0.8 -0.1 -2.4 -0.7 0.7 0.8 -1.0
      Fiscal drag -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.4
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9
      Legislation changes -0.1 0.2 0.0 -1.8 -0.1 0.8 0.3 -0.8
      Residual -0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.1 0.7 0.3
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
    Indirect taxes 0.0 0.5 -0.1 0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.4 1.0
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.3
      Legislation changes 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.9
      Residual 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.7
   Taxes and social contributions overall -0.4 1.4 -0.4 -2.6 -1.3 0.3 1.4 -1.6
      Fiscal drag -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.5
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.8
      Legislation changes -0.3 0.2 -0.2 -1.8 -0.1 0.8 0.6 -0.8
      Residual
3) -0.3 1.0 0.1 -0.6 -0.9 -0.3 1.0 -0.1
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2
   Non-tax-related revenue
4) -0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.7 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.1
      of which EU
5)
Total primary expenditure 0.1 0.7 0.1 1.2 0.5 0.0 -0.6 2.0
   Social payments -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.2
      of which old-age pensions 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
      of which unemployment benefits 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
      of which social transfers in kind 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.3
   Subsidies -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2
      of which EU
6) -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
   Compensation of employees 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2
   Intermediate consumption 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.1
   Government investment 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.3
   Other
7) 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.8
      of which EU
8) 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0
Memorandum items
   Health care
9) 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.3
   Trend growth of real GDP 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.5
   Change in GDP deflator 1.7 1.6 3.9 5.2 3.8 2.5 0.9
   Change in public employees 3.1 0.9 0.8 1.8 2.1 0.4 -0.7
1 Change in unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures as percentage of nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the 
change in the ratio of the adjusted balance to trend nominal GDP might deviate slightly from the change in the ratio to nominal GDP of the 
unadjusted balance less cyclical component less temporary measures. –  2 Fiscal drag and decoupling associated with taxes and social 
contributions paid in the public sector. For social contributions and indirect taxes also the public sector residual might be included to fully reflect 
revenue from public sector. – 3 Also includes the change in the adjusted ratio of direct taxes not by corporations/households. – 4 Other current 
transfers receivable, sales and total capital revenue. – 5 Net receipts from EC budget if country is a net recepient from EC budget. Empty if country 
is net payer to EC budget. – 6 Expenditure paid by EC budget that is spent under category "Subsidies". – 7 Other current transfers payable,
other net acquisitions of non-financial assets and capital transfers. – 8 If country is a net payer to EC budget: net payments to EC budget less 
expenditure paid by EC budget that is not spent under category "Other". If country is a net recipient from EC budget: expenditure paid by EC budget 
that is spent under category "Other". – 9 Social benefits, social transfers in kind and other current transfers that can be allocated into the function of 
the provision of public health care services.
Note: Due to rounding there might be deviations between aggregate numbers and the sum of individual numbers.
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lowest tax brackets. This has a degressive effect which was particularly sizeable because of 
high nominal wage increases. For the other revenue categories, fiscal drag was only minor. As 
employment growth was strong and wages increased considerably in the years 1998-2003, the 
positive contribution of the decoupling of the base from GDP was substantial for both direct 
taxes payable by households and social contributions. Decoupling contributed negatively to 
indirect tax receipts, reflecting relatively sluggish private consumption growth.  
 
With a new cabinet taking office in 1998, legislation changes contributed relatively little to 
the observed revenue changes up to 2000. On balance, the tax burden was relieved somewhat. 
The tax reform of 2001 had a major negative impact on revenues. On balance, it is estimated 
to have lowered tax revenues by 1.8% of GDP in 2001. The reform implied a shift from direct 
to indirect tax revenues. Income tax rates were lowered, the income tax base was broadened 
by eliminating various tax deductions, and social contribution rates were decreased. At the 
same time, the VAT rate was increased from 17.5% to 19%, and energy taxes were increased. 
After 2002, the tax and social contribution burden was increased again in an effort to redress 
public finance problems. In particular, social contributions and energy taxes were raised. 
 
The overall residual component is mainly explained by direct taxes on corporations, with 
particularly substantial residual contribution in the years 2002 and 2003. The likely cause is 
the complicated relation between profits and corporate taxation. When calculating the 
cyclically adjusted corporate tax revenues, an elasticity with respect to gross operating surplus 
of 1 is assumed. This is a far cry from the compensation schemes available for corporations, 
enabling them to carry back and forward losses for many years when determining taxable 
profits. Furthermore, it seems likely that the downturn on the stock markets and the related 
substantial write-offs on corporate balance sheets impaired corporate tax revenues − effects 
which are not fully captured in the tax base and elasticities used here. Another factor in the 
residual development of corporate taxes is natural gas revenue, which partly accrues to the 
government in the form of corporate tax on Gasunie’s profits. In 2001, this factor accounted 
for an increase in corporate taxes of 0.1% of GDP under the influence of rising (oil and) gas 
prices, but in 2003 it fell again by the same amount. 
 
For other revenue categories, the overall residual was fairly small. In individual years, some 
sizeable residuals appeared though. For direct taxes payable by households, additional 
variations in tax receipts comes from the deduction of mortgage interest payments and 
pension premiums. Mortgage interest payments were increasing annually by 0.05% of GDP 
on average in the years 1998-2004. Pension premiums were lowered in the years 1999-2001, 
as the stock market boomed. As from 2002, premiums were increased again. For social 
contributions, the high residuals in some years may reflect inaccurate estimations of the 
elasticities and, especially in the years 2001-2002, of the effect of legislation changes. Further 
analysis would be required to explain the origin of these residuals. The residuals for indirect 
taxes may point to composition effects in private consumption. The boom in private 
consumption up to and including 2000 and the bust afterwards were mainly concentrated in 
durable consumption (home furnishing, white and brown goods, computer equipment). These 
goods are all subject to the regular VAT of 17.5/19%. Daily requirements like food, on the 
other hand, are subject to the lower tariff of 6%. This composition effect in private 
34
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 579
January 2006 
consumption is not captured by the framework, and may partly explain the observed positive 
residuals up to 2000 and the negative residuals afterwards. 
 
Primary expenditure increased up to 2002. Afterwards, a downward trend started. Social 
payments decreased up to 2001, supported by decreasing unemployment and rising 
participation rates. This was partly offset by increasing compensation of employees both due 
to rising public sector employment and public sector wages. Starting in 2000, health care 
expenditure growth accelerated, reflecting increasing wages and employment, and an effort to 
reduce waiting lists. In 2003, consolidation measures turned the upward trend of primary 
expenditure around. Public wages and social benefit increases were contained from this year 
onwards, and measures were taken to curb health care expenditure.  
 
3.7 Portugal 
Between 1997 and 2004, the general government balance as a percentage of GDP improved 
by 0.7 percentage point.33 While the impact of the economic cycle was virtually nil in this 
period, the recourse to temporary measures was very significant in the 2002-2004 period. 
Adjusting for the effects of the economic cycle and for temporary measures, the structural 
balance as a percentage of trend GDP deteriorated by 1.3 percentage points, reaching -4.4% 
in 2004. This outcome resulted from a sizeable increase in the expenditure ratio (2.7 
percentage points), which more than compensated the rise in the revenue ratio (1.3 percentage 
points). As interest expenditure as a percentage of trend GDP decreased by 1.4 percentage 
points, mainly due to the decline in the implicit interest rate on public debt, the increase in the 
primary expenditure ratio was very significant (4.1 percentage points). As a consequence, 
there was a considerable deterioration of the structural primary balance ratio (2.7 percentage 
points), which predominantly concentrated in the years from 1997 to 2001. 
 
The rise in the structural revenue ratio in the 1998-2004 period resulted from strong increases 
in tax receipts and social contributions that more than outweighed the decline in non-tax 
related revenue. However, if the effects of tax receipts and social contributions recorded also 
on the expenditure side are netted out, the increase appears less pronounced. Indeed, the 
evolution of social contributions in this period stems predominantly from an increase in the 
social contributions of civil servants, which are recorded on the expenditure side under the 
item compensation of employees, and in imputed social contributions that are included in 
social payments and compensation of employees. Adjusted for these two items, which are 
treated as a residual in the current application of the methodology for Portugal, the overall tax 
and social contributions ratios increased only by 0.6 percentage point between 1997 and 2004.  
 
In this period, fiscal drag represented 0.6 percentage point and stemmed from the positive 
effect of progressive taxation in direct taxes paid by households. It is worth mentioning that, 
although the elasticity of indirect taxes to its macroeconomic base used in the calculation of 
the cyclical component is slightly above one, due to shifts in private consumption toward a 
bigger share of goods and services taxed at the (higher) standard VAT rate in periods of 
strong growth (and the opposite during recessions), a nil fiscal drag was assumed. Indeed, the 
                                                 
33 This section is based on the national accounts data and projections available at the end of May 2005. 
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Portugal
Table 2: Changes in structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
Increasing +, decreasing - 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Unadjusted balance
1) 0.4 0.3 0.0 -1.5 1.7 -0.2 0.0 0.7
Cyclical component 0.8 0.8 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -1.2 0.0 0.1
Temporary measures -0.4 0.0 0.3 -0.3 1.4 1.1 -0.2 1.9
Balance -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 0.9 0.0 0.2 -1.3
Interest payments -0.7 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.4
   due to changes in average interest rate -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -1.4
   due to changes in debt level -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Primary balance -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -1.1 0.8 -0.2 0.2 -2.7
Total revenue 0.0 0.9 -0.3 -0.5 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.3
   Direct taxes payable by corporations -0.2 0.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.6 -0.1
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
      Legislation changes -0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.3
      Residual -0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 0.5 -0.5
   Direct taxes payable by households -0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.2
      Fiscal drag 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
      Legislation changes 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.3
      Residual -0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
   Social contributions 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.7
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
      Legislation changes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Residual 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.8
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.3
    Indirect taxes 0.4 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5
      Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Decoupling of base from GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2
      Legislation changes 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.1 1.0
      Residual 0.6 0.4 0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.1 0.7 0.7 -0.6 0.1 0.0 0.9 1.9
      Fiscal drag 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
      Decoupling of base from GDP 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6
      Legislation changes -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4
      Residual
3) 0.1 0.5 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 -1.0 0.3 0.3
      Memo item: included in expenditure
2) 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.7
   Non-tax-related revenue
4) -0.1 0.2 -1.0 0.1 0.5 0.2 -0.4 -0.6
      of which EU
5) 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -0.4 0.4 0.6 -0.6 -0.7
Total primary expenditure 0.8 1.6 0.5 0.7 -0.2 0.4 0.3 4.1
   Social payments 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 1.4 0.6 4.4
      of which old-age pensions 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 2.3
      of which unemployment benefits 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3
      of which social transfers in kind 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.1 1.4
   Subsidies 0.2 0.2 -0.6 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
      of which EU
6) 0.3 0.0 -0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1
   Compensation of employees 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.1 -0.8 0.0 1.2
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.1
   Government investment -0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 -1.0
   Other
7) 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.6 -0.4 -0.8
      of which EU
8) 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 0.5 -0.4 -0.4
Memorandum items
   Health care
9) -------
   Trend growth of real GDP 2.9 2.6 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.1
   Change in GDP deflator 3.8 3.1 3.5 4.3 4.4 2.8 2.4
   Change in public employees 3.4 4.9 2.2 2.5 1.9 -5.9 -0.7
1 Change in unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures as percentage of nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the 
change in the ratio of the adjusted balance to trend nominal GDP might deviate slightly from the change in the ratio to nominal GDP of the 
unadjusted balance less cyclical component less temporary measures. –  2 Fiscal drag and decoupling associated with taxes and social 
contributions paid in the public sector. For social contributions and indirect taxes also the public sector residual might be included to fully reflect 
revenue from public sector. – 3 Also includes the change in the adjusted ratio of direct taxes not by corporations/households. – 4 Other current 
transfers receivable, sales and total capital revenue. – 5 Net receipts from EC budget if country is a net recepient from EC budget. Empty if country 
is net payer to EC budget. – 6 Expenditure paid by EC budget that is spent under category "Subsidies". – 7 Other current transfers payable,
other net acquisitions of non-financial assets and capital transfers. – 8 If country is a net payer to EC budget: net payments to EC budget less 
expenditure paid by EC budget that is not spent under category "Other". If country is a net recipient from EC budget: expenditure paid by EC budget 
that is spent under category "Other". – 9 Social benefits, social transfers in kind and other current transfers that can be allocated into the function of 
the provision of public health care services.
Note: Due to rounding there might be deviations between aggregate numbers and the sum of individual numbers.
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changes in the consumption pattern are essentially of a cyclical nature, not contributing to the 
improvement/deterioration of the structural indirect tax receipts ratio.  
 
The effects of the decoupling of the tax bases from GDP were not particularly significant in 
the Portuguese case, with the exception of direct taxes paid by corporations. However, the 
decomposition of corporate income tax receipts is not straightforward given the difficulties 
associated with the choice of a proper macroeconomic base, the lagged effects resulting from 
the deduction of losses and the uncertainty of the estimates of the effects of changes in tax 
legislation. Indeed, the practical implementation of this framework to the Portuguese data 
showed that the estimated elasticity (6 with respect to real private GDP) is too high. As a 
provisional solution, the corporate income tax receipts elasticity used in the presented 
calculations is lowered to 4 but a deeper analysis of the question will be carried out later. 
Based on these assumptions, the effect of the decoupling of the tax base from GDP in 
corporate income tax receipts amounts to 0.6 percentage point in the period under analysis, 
although it is almost offset by a residual of the same magnitude with an opposite sign. Finally, 
a small decoupling effect occurred in personal income tax receipts, resulting on average from 
a growth of the wage bill above trend GDP in this period. 
 
On taxes and social contributions overall, the effects of changes in legislation were not very 
significant between 1998 and 2004, and represented as a whole an increase of 0.4 percentage 
point. Nevertheless, the analysis by category of tax shows that the rises in indirect taxation, 
essentially VAT and tax on oil products, more than compensated the declines in direct 
taxation paid by both households and corporations. 
 
Finally, the residual component appears to have had almost no effect in the change of the 
structural tax revenue ratio over the period 1998-2004 as a whole though it was sizeable in 
some years. However, if the part of social contributions that is also included in expenditure is 
subtracted, the residual becomes considerably negative (-1.4 percentage points). In fact, all 
taxes, direct and indirect, present negative residuals. In the case of indirect taxes, the positive 
contribution of the residual to fiscal consolidation between 1997 and 2000 basically relied on 
the structural increase of the average implicit VAT rate. This one can be explained by a more 
significant shift in the composition of private consumption towards more goods and services 
taxed at the standard rate and less at the reduced rates than the one assumed implicitly in the 
calculation of the cyclical component, the modernisation of the distribution circuits and some 
efficiency gains in tax collection. In 2001, with the beginning of the cyclical downturn, this 
behaviour is partially reversed, more than offsetting the previous favourable evolution, which 
may partly indicate an underestimation of the cyclical component elasticity. Regarding direct 
taxes payable by households, the negative residual can be explained by errors in the 
measurement of tax legislation changes and, in some years, by net reimbursements differing 
from what would be expected from the legislative changes and their reflection in the update of 
the withholding tables. Lastly, it should be mentioned that the overall positive contribution of 
the residual of social contributions to consolidation might be partly explained by efficiency 
gains in tax collection. The evolution of the residual over time is probably related to the pro-
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cyclical behaviour of firms that in periods of low economic growth tend to delay the 
fulfilment of their legal obligations.34 
 
The ratio of non-tax-related revenue to trend GDP declined by 0.6 percentage point between 
1997 and 2004, which can be almost entirely explained by the decrease in net receipts from 
the EU budget. 
 
The increase in the primary expenditure ratio by 4.1 percentage points stems predominantly 
from the evolution of social payments and compensation of employees ratios, which rose by 
4.4 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively, outweighing the decline in the public investment 
ratio (-1.0 percentage point). The behaviour of social payments is largely related to the 
increase in pension expenditure, both in the private sector and the civil servants pension 
system. It resulted from an expansion of the number of pensioners, related with the ageing of 
population in the private sector case, and a rise in the average pension, since the systems have 
not reached maturity yet. Part of the rise in compensation of employees is owing to the above-
mentioned increase in social contributions of the civil servants pension system. Furthermore, 
it is a consequence of the rise in the number of civil servants, the effect of automatic 
promotions and extraordinary revisions in some specific carriers over the 1998-2001 period. 
From the middle of 2002 to 2004 the fiscal authorities implemented some measures in order 
to limit the growth of the civil servants wage bill. They consisted, essentially, in the control of 
the number of civil servants, the elimination of extraordinary revisions in carriers and an 
almost freeze in the update of the public employees wage scale in 2003 and 2004. Finally, it 
should be noted that the transformation of some public hospitals into public corporations in 
2003 let to a shift in expenditure categories. More specifically, in that year a distinct increase 
in social transfers in kind was roughly offset by a decline in compensation of employees and 
intermediate consumption. If these hospitals had remained within the general government 
sector, social transfers in kind would have grown less strongly and compensation of 
employees and intermediate consumption would have recorded higher overall changes in their 
ratios to GDP. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, a disaggregated framework for the analysis of public finance structural devel-
opments was developed and applied to six countries. Structural balances, in this case com-
puted by correcting the budgetary aggregates for the impact of the cycle and temporary meas-
ures, represent important indicators for fiscal sustainability and for medium-term fiscal devel-
opments. The application of this framework has shown the benefits of analysing structural 
developments which may significantly differ from the changes in unadjusted aggregates. In 
particular, it demonstrates the usefulness of the framework for the analysis and monitoring of 
past and projected developments in public finances in a multi-country setting. 
 
In almost all countries examined the structural fiscal primary balance worsened. As the 
analysis reveals, in general both structural macroeconomic developments − via their impact 
                                                 
34 Indeed, this residual increases by 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.1 percentage point of trend GDP in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 
2002, and declines by 0.1 percentage point in both 2003 and 2004. 
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on revenue from taxes and social contributions − as well as policy measures contributed to 
this worsening. On the revenue side, fiscal drag, differences between the trend growth of GDP 
and the respective macroeconomic bases, and legislation changes − in particular cuts in direct 
taxes − explain in general a significant part of the changes in budgetary ratios. However, in 
individual years and in some instances also over longer periods, specific factors that are not 
necessarily linked to the macroeconomic development or recent policy decisions, had a 
significant impact on the structural revenue ratios. In many cases, these factors are identified. 
The analysis of the structural development of individual budget categories on the expenditure 
side shows the main driving factors underlying the expenditure stance. In the countries under 
review, the evolution of social payments, in particular old-age-related expenditure and health 
care, were particularly relevant for the fiscal worsening. 
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Appendix A: Elasticities, information on temporary measures, tables on structural levels 
and figures on structural developments for individual countries 
A.1 Elasticities underlying the cyclical adjustment and the breakdown of changes in the 
structural revenue ratio 
 
A.2 Information on temporary measures35 
Year  Measure  Size (% of GDP) 
Belgium 
1997  HST payments received from the Netherlands  0.2 
1997/1999/2000  HST investment grants  -0.2/-0.1/-0.1 
1998  Covering of exchange losses NMKN/SNC  -0.3 
1999/2001  Reimbursement of Maribel reductions in  
  social security contributions  0.1/0.1 
2000  Exceptional expenditure due to the food contamination crisis -0.2 
2001/2002  Decreased withholding rates for marriage allowance  -0.1/-0.1 
2001-2004  Insufficient indexation of tax brackets in  
  2001 and 2002 tax withholding  0.1/0.1/-0.2/-0.1 
2001-2006  Real estate sales  0.1/0.1/0.1/0.2/0.1/0.2 
2002  Personal income tax reduction in Flemish Region  -0.1 
2003 Exceptional  Belgacom  dividend  0.1 
  Exceptional subsidies De Post/La Poste  -0.1 
  Reimbursement animal contributions (slaughterhouses)  -0.1 
  Debt assumption Antwerp hospitals  -0.1 
  Capital transfer in exchange for assumption of pension 
 liabilities:  Belgacom  1.8 
2003/2004  Increased withholding rates for municipal taxes  0.1/0.1 
2003/2004 Funding  NMBS/SNCB  -0.4/0.4 
2004  Capital transfer in exchange for assumption of 
  pension liabilities: Biac  0.1 
                                                 
35 A positive (negative) figure indicates a(n) improvement (worsening) of the budget balance. 
Elasticity of: with respect to: Belgium Finland Germany
1) Italy
2) The Netherlands Portugal
3)
direct taxes payable by 
corporations
operating surplus
0.7 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 4.0
direct taxes payable by 
households
average compensation 
of employees 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.6 1.1 1.7
number of employees 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
social contributions average compensation 
of employees 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0
number of employees 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0




0.9 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
1 As described in Appendix C.2 the delineation of categories deviates from the standard proceeding. For profit-related taxes fixed lags between the development in revenue and the 
macroeconomic base of up to two years are assumed. – 2 Time lag of one year for direct taxes payable by corporations. – 3 For indirect taxes an elasticity of 1.0 is considered in the 
breakdown of the structural revenue ratio.
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  Increased withholding rates on replacement incomes  0.1 
  Reimbursement stock exchange taxes  -0.1 
  Exceptional pension contributions from local 
  Authorities to Ethias  -0.1 
2004/2006 Tax  amnesty  0.2/0.1 
2005  Aquafin VAT ruling  0.1 
  Temporary reduction of energy costs paid by households  -0.1 
2005/2006/2007  Securitisation of tax arrears  0.2/0.1/-0.1 
 
Germany 
2000  Sale of UMTS licenses  2.5 
   Compensation for NS forced labour  -0.1 
2001  Equity injection for Bankgesellschaft Berlin  -0.1 
 
Italy 
1997  Surcharge on personal income tax  0.3 
  Tax and social contributions amnesty  0.1 
  Shortening of payment lags for oil, methane and  
 electricity  taxes  0.1 
  Lengthening of severance payment lags for  
 public  employees  0.1 
  Advances on indirect tax revenue collection  0.2 
  Bringing forward of taxation on severance payments  0.3 
   Adjustment for swap/forward rate agreement  0.2* 
1998  Temporary withholding tax on self-employed  0.1 
  Tax and social contributions amnesty  0.1 
  Bringing forward of taxation on severance payments  0.2 
  Change in the timing of pension payments  0.3 
2000   Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.1 
  Sale of UMTS licenses  1.2 
2001   Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.2 
  Temporary withholding taxes on extraordinary 
  operations at reduced rates  0.5 
2002   Adjustment for swap/forward rate agreement  0.2* 
   Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.9 
  Temporary withholding taxes on extraordinary 
  operations at reduced rates  0.5 
2003   Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.2 
  Temporary withholding taxes on extraordinary 
  operations at reduced rates  0.3 
  Tax amnesty (including on off-shore placements)  1.4 
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2004   Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.3 
  Temporary withholding taxes on extraordinary 
  operations at reduced rates  0.6 
   Adjustment for swap/forward rate agreement  0.1* 
   Tax amnesty (including building offences)  0.7 
                                                * relevant only for EDP deficit 
 
The Netherlands 
1997  Disputed treatment of interest on government debt  0.1 
2000  Sale of UMTS licenses  0.6 
2001  Redemption of rights of DSM-pension fund on part  
  of natural gas revenue  -0.3 
2004  Advancing various non-tax receipts  0.2 
 
Portugal 
1997 Transfer  of  Banco Nacional Ultramarino and Macau  
  in exchange for future pension payments  0.4 
2000   Sale of UMTS licenses  0.3 
2002   Sale of the fixed telecommunications network 
 to  Portugal Telecom 0.3 
   Sale of future toll rights  0.2 
  Tax amnesty (on interest surcharges on the payment 
  of arrears on tax and social security contributions)  0.9 
2003   Additional effect of the previous year tax amnesty  0.2 
   Transfer of the postal office in exchange for future 
 pension  payments  1.0 
  Securitization of tax and social contributions arrears  1.3 
2004   Transfers of CGD, ANA, NAV and INCM in exchange 
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Temporary measures (as a percentage of trend GDP)
Belgium 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  0.4 0.2 1.2 0.8
Total revenue 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.8 0.3
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1
   Non-tax-related revenue 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.9 0.2
Total expenditure  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.3  -0.1  0.6 -0.5 
   Interest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Social payments  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Subsidies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 
   Compensation of employees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Government investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
   Other 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.2  -0.1  0.6 -0.2 
Finland 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total revenue 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Non-tax-related revenue 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total expenditure  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Interest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Social payments  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Subsidies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Compensation of employees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Government investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Germany 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 -0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0
Total revenue 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Non-tax-related revenue 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total expenditure  0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.4  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Interest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Social payments  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Subsidies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Compensation of employees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Government investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.4  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) 1.1 0.6 0.0 1.3 0.7 1.6 2.1 1.6
Total revenue 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 1.8 1.3
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.6
   Non-tax-related revenue 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.5 0.7
Total expenditure  -0.1  -0.4  0.0 -1.3 -0.2 -1.0 -0.3 -0.3 
   Interest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Social payments  -0.1  -0.4  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Subsidies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Compensation of employees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Government investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1  -0.2  -0.9  -0.2  -0.3 
   Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.2  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.0 
The Netherlands 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 -0.3  0.0 0.0 0.2
Total revenue 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Non-tax-related revenue 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Total expenditure  0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7  0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Interest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Social payments  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Subsidies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Compensation of employees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Government investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7  0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Portugal 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.4 2.5 2.2
Total revenue 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.5 2.2
   Taxes and social contributions overall 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.5 0.0
   Non-tax-related revenue 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.2
Total expenditure  0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4  0.0 -0.5  0.0 0.0
   Interest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Social payments  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Subsidies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Compensation of employees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Intermediate consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Government investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4  0.0 -0.5  0.0 0.0
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A.3 Tables on structural levels 
 
Belgium
Table 1. Structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Unadjusted deficit (-) or surplus (+)
1) -2.1 -0.8  -0.5 0.0 0.6 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
   Cyclical component -0.5  -0.4  0.3 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.0 -0.2 
   Temporary measures -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  0.4 0.2 1.2 0.8
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) -1.4  -0.2  -0.7  -0.5  -0.5  -0.6  -1.2  -0.7 
Total revenue 50.0 50.4 50.1 50.2 50.2 50.2 49.6 49.8
      Total current revenue 49.6 50.0 49.6 49.7 49.7 49.7 49.0 49.2
      Total capital revenue 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
Total expenditure  51.4 50.6 50.7 50.7 50.6 50.9 50.8 50.5
      Total current expenditure  48.5 47.9 47.7 47.6 47.9 48.2 48.2 47.8
      Total capital expenditure 2.8 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Primary deficit (-) or surplus (+) 6.3 7.1 6.2 6.2 6.1 5.2 4.1 4.2
    Deficit (-) or surplus (+)  -1.4  -0.2  -0.7  -0.5  -0.5  -0.6  -1.2  -0.7 
    Interest payable 7.7 7.3 6.9 6.8 6.6 5.8 5.3 4.9
Total current revenue 49.6 50.0 49.6 49.7 49.7 49.7 49.0 49.2
   Direct taxes 16.9 17.4 16.8 17.1 17.3 17.1 16.6 16.7
        of which payable by corporations 2.9 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.0 3.3
        of which payable by households 13.9 13.9 13.4 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.5 13.4
   Indirect taxes 13.6 13.5 13.9 13.8 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.6
        of which VAT 6.8 6.7 7.2 7.2 6.9 7.0 6.8 7.0
        of which taxes on energy  1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5
   Social contributions 16.5 16.5 16.3 16.1 16.1 16.5 16.5 16.4
        of which employers' actual social contributions  8.7 8.7 8.7 8.4 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.4
        of which employees' social contributions  4.4 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5
   Other current transfers receivable 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.9
        of which interest receivable 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2
   Sales 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6
Total current expenditure  48.5 47.9 47.7 47.6 47.9 48.2 48.2 47.8
    Current transfers  25.9 25.7 25.8 25.8 26.2 26.4 27.0 27.3
      Social payments  22.8 22.5 22.6 22.6 22.9 23.3 23.7 23.9
        of which old age pensions 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.7
        of which unemployment benefits 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5
      Subsidies 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6
      Other current transfers payable 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8
    Interest 7.7 7.3 6.9 6.8 6.6 5.8 5.3 4.9
    Compensation of employees 11.8 11.6 11.8 11.8 11.8 12.2 12.2 12.0
        of which: Employers actual social contributions  1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3
    Intermediate consumption 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7
Gross savings 1.0 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.6 0.9 1.4
Total capital revenue 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
        of which capital taxes  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
Total capital expenditure  2.8 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
     government investment 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8
     other net acquisitions of non-financial assets  -0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 
     capital transfers  1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
1 Ratios of unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures with respect to nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the ratio of 








Table 1. Structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Unadjusted deficit (-) or surplus (+)
1) -1.3 1.6 2.2 7.1 5.2 4.3 2.3 1.9
   Cyclical component -0.1  1.0 1.2 1.4 1.0 -0.2  -0.1  0.0
   Temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) -1.1  0.7 1.0 5.8 4.3 4.5 2.4 1.8
Total revenue 56.2 55.1 54.6 56.9 54.2 54.5 53.1 52.4
      Total current revenue 56.0 54.8 54.3 56.6 53.9 54.2 52.8 52.1
      Total capital revenue 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total expenditure  57.3 54.4 53.5 51.0 49.9 50.0 50.6 50.6
      Total current expenditure  53.9 51.1 50.4 48.0 46.8 46.9 47.4 47.5
      Total capital expenditure 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.1
Primary deficit (-) or surplus (+) 3.2 4.3 4.2 8.8 7.0 6.7 4.4 3.7
    Deficit (-) or surplus (+)  -1.1  0.7 1.0 5.8 4.3 4.5 2.4 1.8
    Interest payable 4.3 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.2 2.0 1.9
Total current revenue 56.0 54.8 54.3 56.6 53.9 54.2 52.8 52.1
   Direct taxes 18.7 18.9 18.8 21.4 19.3 19.3 18.0 17.8
        of which payable by corporations 3.5 4.4 4.6 6.0 4.5 4.4 3.7 3.8
        of which payable by households 15.1 14.4 14.2 15.2 14.6 14.8 14.3 13.9
   Indirect taxes 15.1 14.7 14.8 14.3 13.9 14.2 14.3 14.1
        of which VAT 8.6 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.5
        of which taxes on energy  2.3 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9
   Social contributions 13.6 13.1 13.2 12.4 12.3 12.3 12.1 12.0
        of which employers' actual social contributions  9.5 9.5 9.6 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.0 8.9
        of which employees' social contributions  3.9 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0
   Other current transfers receivable 3.5 3.3 2.8 3.7 3.9 3.6 3.3 3.3
        of which interest receivable 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.5
   Sales 5.1 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.0 4.9
Total current expenditure  53.9 51.1 50.4 48.0 46.8 46.9 47.4 47.5
    Current transfers  26.1 24.9 24.7 23.2 22.5 22.7 22.9 22.8
      Social payments  22.8 21.7 21.6 20.2 19.7 20.0 20.2 20.1
        of which old age pensions 12.1 11.7 11.7 11.2 11.0 11.3 11.4 11.3
        of which unemployment benefits 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9
      Subsidies 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9
      Other current transfers payable 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
    Interest 4.3 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.2 2.0 1.9
    Compensation of employees 14.7 14.1 14.0 13.6 13.4 13.5 13.7 13.8
        of which: Employers actual social contributions  3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1
    Intermediate consumption 8.8 8.5 8.5 8.3 8.1 8.5 8.9 9.0
Gross savings 2.1 3.7 3.9 8.6 7.1 7.3 5.3 4.6
Total capital revenue 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
        of which capital taxes  0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total capital expenditure  3.5 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.1
     government investment 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9
     other net acquisitions of non-financial assets  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.0 0.0 -0.0  -0.1  -0.0 
     capital transfers  0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
1 Ratios of unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures with respect to nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the ratio of 








Table 1. Structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Unadjusted deficit (-) or surplus (+)
1) -2.6 -2.2  -1.5 1.3 -2.8  -3.7  -4.0  -3.7 
   Cyclical component -0.6  -0.4  -0.1  0.5 0.6 0.2 -0.2  -0.3 
   Temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 -0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) -2.0  -1.8  -1.4  -1.6  -3.4  -3.9  -3.7  -3.4 
Total revenue 46.3 46.4 46.9 47.3 45.3 44.5 44.2 43.2
      Total current revenue 46.0 46.1 46.6 47.0 45.0 44.2 43.9 42.8
      Total capital revenue 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total expenditure  48.3 48.2 48.3 48.9 48.7 48.4 47.9 46.6
      Total current expenditure  45.3 45.1 45.2 45.7 45.4 45.2 44.9 43.7
      Total capital expenditure 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.8
Primary deficit (-) or surplus (+) 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.6 -0.3  -1.0  -0.8  -0.6 
    Deficit (-) or surplus (+)  -2.0  -1.8  -1.4  -1.6  -3.4  -3.9  -3.7  -3.4 
    Interest payable 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.0 2.8
Total current revenue 46.0 46.1 46.6 47.0 45.0 44.2 43.9 42.8
   Direct taxes 11.1 11.4 11.8 12.4 10.9 10.6 10.4 10.0
        of which payable by corporations 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9
        of which payable by households 9.8 9.9 10.1 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.0
   Indirect taxes 11.9 12.0 12.5 12.6 12.3 12.1 12.2 12.0
        of which VAT 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.2
        of which taxes on energy  1.8 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.2
   Social contributions 19.2 19.0 18.7 18.6 18.3 18.0 18.0 17.8
        of which employers' actual social contributions  7.7 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.2 7.3 7.2
        of which employees' social contributions  7.0 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.5
   Other current transfers receivable 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3
        of which interest receivable 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
   Sales 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9
Total current expenditure  45.3 45.1 45.2 45.7 45.4 45.2 44.9 43.7
    Current transfers  29.6 29.5 29.7 30.3 30.3 30.2 30.1 29.3
      Social payments  26.6 26.5 26.6 27.2 27.4 27.6 27.5 26.9
        of which old age pensions 11.4 11.6 11.7 11.9 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.9
        of which unemployment benefits 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.9
      Subsidies 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6
      Other current transfers payable 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8
    Interest 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.0 2.8
    Compensation of employees 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6
        of which: Employers actual social contributions 
    Intermediate consumption 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.0
Gross savings 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.3 -0.4  -1.0  -0.9  -0.9 
Total capital revenue 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
        of which capital taxes  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Total capital expenditure  3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.8
     government investment 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
     other net acquisitions of non-financial assets  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
     capital transfers  1.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5
1 Ratios of unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures with respect to nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the ratio of 








Table 1. Structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Unadjusted deficit (-) or surplus (+)
1) -2.9 -3.1  -1.8 -0.8  -3.2  -2.9  -3.3  -3.3 
   Cyclical component -0.7  -0.2  0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.1 -0.1 
   Temporary measures 1.1 0.6 0.0 1.3 0.7 1.6 2.1 1.6
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) -3.3  -3.5  -2.0  -2.6  -4.6  -4.8  -5.4  -4.8 
Total revenue 48.3 46.9 47.0 46.5 46.0 45.3 44.2 44.1
      Total current revenue 48.2 46.7 46.6 46.3 45.9 45.0 44.1 44.0
      Total capital revenue 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Total expenditure  51.6 50.5 49.0 49.0 50.6 50.1 49.6 48.9
      Total current expenditure  47.9 46.6 44.9 45.0 45.9 45.2 44.8 44.5
      Total capital expenditure 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.5
Primary deficit (-) or surplus (+) 6.2 4.7 4.7 4.0 2.1 1.1 -0.0  0.3
    Deficit (-) or surplus (+)  -3.3  -3.5  -2.0  -2.6  -4.6  -4.8  -5.4  -4.8 
    Interest payable 9.6 8.3 6.8 6.6 6.7 6.0 5.4 5.1
Total current revenue 48.2 46.7 46.6 46.3 45.9 45.0 44.1 44.0
   Direct taxes 16.5 14.7 15.0 14.8 14.6 13.9 13.5 13.2
        of which payable by corporations 4.2 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.2
        of which payable by households 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.1 11.7 11.4 11.1 10.9
   Indirect taxes 12.7 15.8 15.4 15.5 15.1 15.0 14.6 14.7
        of which VAT 5.8 6.2 6.1 6.6 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.0
        of which taxes on energy  2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9
   Social contributions 15.5 12.9 12.7 12.8 12.6 12.8 12.9 13.0
        of which employers' actual social contributions  10.7 8.8 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.7 8.9 8.9
        of which employees' social contributions  2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4
   Other current transfers receivable 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.8
        of which interest receivable 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
   Sales 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4
Total current expenditure  47.9 46.6 44.9 45.0 45.9 45.2 44.8 44.5
    Current transfers  22.1 22.9 22.6 22.7 23.1 23.3 23.2 23.4
      Social payments  20.0 19.8 19.7 19.8 20.0 20.3 20.4 20.6
        of which old age pensions 11.2 11.4 11.3 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.5 11.6
        of which unemployment benefits 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
      Subsidies 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4
      Other current transfers payable 0.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4
    Interest 9.6 8.3 6.8 6.6 6.7 6.0 5.4 5.1
    Compensation of employees 11.6 10.6 10.6 10.7 10.9 10.9 11.0 11.0
        of which: Employers actual social contributions  3.4 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9
    Intermediate consumption 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.1 4.9
Gross savings 0.2 0.2 1.7 1.2 -0.1  -0.1  -0.7  -0.5 
Total capital revenue 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
        of which capital taxes  -0.0  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Total capital expenditure  3.7 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.5
     government investment 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9
     other net acquisitions of non-financial assets  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     capital transfers  1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.5
1 Ratios of unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures with respect to nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the ratio of 








Table 1. Structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Unadjusted deficit (-) or surplus (+)
1) -1.1 -0.7 0.6 2.1 -0.1  -0.3  -2.0  -3.2 
   Cyclical component -0.9  -0.0  0.4 1.0 2.1 1.9 0.4 -0.8 
   Temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 -0.3  0.0 0.0 0.2
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) -0.2  -0.7  0.2 0.5 -2.1  -3.8  -3.5  -1.5 
Total revenue 46.4 45.7 47.1 46.9 44.9 43.3 43.4 44.7
      Total current revenue 46.1 45.4 46.7 46.4 44.6 42.9 43.0 44.6
      Total capital revenue 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1
Total expenditure  46.6 46.4 46.8 46.4 47.0 47.1 46.9 46.3
      Total current expenditure  44.0 43.6 43.7 42.9 43.1 42.9 42.8 42.6
      Total capital expenditure 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.9 4.2 4.1 3.7
Primary deficit (-) or surplus (+) 4.7 4.0 4.6 4.3 1.2 -1.0  -0.9  1.0
    Deficit (-) or surplus (+)  -0.2  -0.7  0.2 0.5 -2.1  -3.8  -3.5  -1.5 
    Interest payable 4.9 4.7 4.4 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.6
Total current revenue 46.1 45.4 46.7 46.4 44.6 42.9 43.0 44.6
   Direct taxes 12.0 11.8 11.9 11.7 11.1 10.9 10.4 10.5
        of which payable by corporations 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.4 2.9 3.1
        of which payable by households 7.7 7.4 7.5 7.4 6.8 7.3 7.3 7.2
   Indirect taxes 12.0 12.1 12.5 12.4 12.9 12.5 12.6 13.0
        of which VAT 6.6 6.6 6.9 6.8 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.3
        of which taxes on energy  0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
   Social contributions 16.1 15.9 16.7 16.7 14.2 13.5 14.3 15.1
        of which employers' actual social contributions  1.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.3
        of which employees' social contributions  13.3 10.4 11.2 11.1 9.0 8.5 9.2 9.7
   Other current transfers receivable 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.3 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.5
        of which interest receivable 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6
   Sales 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5
Total current expenditure  44.0 43.6 43.7 42.9 43.1 42.9 42.8 42.6
    Current transfers  23.4 23.2 23.2 23.0 23.0 23.1 23.1 23.1
      Social payments  20.0 19.8 19.6 19.5 19.5 19.7 19.9 19.8
        of which old age pensions 4.9 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
        of which unemployment benefits 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1
      Subsidies 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7
      Other current transfers payable 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.6
    Interest 4.9 4.7 4.4 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.6
    Compensation of employees 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.9 9.8 9.9 10.0 9.9
        of which: Employers actual social contributions  0.9 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
    Intermediate consumption 5.9 6.0 6.3 6.2 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.0
Gross savings 2.1 1.7 2.9 3.5 1.5 -0.0  0.2 2.0
Total capital revenue 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1
        of which capital taxes  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
Total capital expenditure  2.6 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.9 4.2 4.1 3.7
     government investment 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.1
     other net acquisitions of non-financial assets  -0.5  -0.7  -0.4  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  0.1 -0.0 
     capital transfers  0.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
1 Ratios of unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures with respect to nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the ratio of 








Table 1. Structural fiscal components (as a percentage of trend GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Unadjusted deficit (-) or surplus (+)
1) -3.6 -3.2  -2.8 -2.8  -4.4  -2.7  -2.9  -2.9 
   Cyclical component -0.9  -0.1  0.8 1.2 1.1 0.4 -0.8  -0.8 
   Temporary measures 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.4 2.5 2.3
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) -3.0  -3.1  -3.7  -4.5  -5.6  -4.6  -4.6  -4.4 
Total revenue 42.3 42.3 43.2 42.9 42.4 43.0 43.1 43.6
      Total current revenue 42.1 42.1 43.0 42.8 41.8 42.5 42.7 43.2
      Total capital revenue 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
Total expenditure  45.3 45.4 46.8 47.3 48.0 47.6 47.8 48.0
      Total current expenditure  38.0 38.3 40.0 41.3 42.1 42.3 42.2 42.8
      Total capital expenditure 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.0 5.8 5.2 5.5 5.2
Primary deficit (-) or surplus (+) 1.1 0.4 -0.4  -1.2  -2.3  -1.5  -1.7  -1.6 
    Deficit (-) or surplus (+)  -3.0  -3.1  -3.7  -4.5  -5.6  -4.6  -4.6  -4.4 
    Interest payable 4.2 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.8
Total current revenue 42.1 42.1 43.0 42.8 41.8 42.5 42.7 43.2
   Direct taxes 9.7 9.3 9.6 10.1 9.6 9.2 8.8 9.3
        of which payable by corporations 3.6 3.4 3.8 3.9 3.5 3.4 2.9 3.5
        of which payable by households 6.1 5.9 5.9 6.2 6.1 5.8 6.0 5.8
   Indirect taxes 14.7 15.1 15.3 15.1 14.9 15.2 15.2 15.2
        of which VAT
        of which taxes on energy 
   Social contributions 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.9 12.0 12.2 12.5 12.9
        of which employers' actual social contributions 
        of which employees' social contributions 
   Other current transfers receivable 4.5 4.2 4.1 3.2 3.0 3.5 3.8 3.3
        of which interest receivable 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3
   Sales 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
Total current expenditure  38.0 38.3 40.0 41.3 42.1 42.3 42.2 42.8
    Current transfers  16.4 17.0 17.8 18.1 18.9 19.3 20.9 21.3
      Social payments  12.9 13.3 13.8 14.4 14.9 15.3 16.7 17.3
        of which old age pensions
        of which unemployment benefits 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
      Subsidies 1.9 2.1 2.3 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2
      Other current transfers payable 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8
    Interest 4.2 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.8
    Compensation of employees 13.6 14.0 14.7 15.4 15.5 15.6 14.8 14.9
        of which: Employers actual social contributions  2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.9
    Intermediate consumption 3.9 3.8 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.4 3.7 3.7
Gross savings 4.1 3.8 3.0 1.5 -0.3  0.2 0.5 0.5
Total capital revenue 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
        of which capital taxes  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Total capital expenditure  7.3 7.1 6.9 6.0 5.8 5.2 5.5 5.2
     government investment 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.1 3.6 3.3 3.3
     other net acquisitions of non-financial assets  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1  0.0
     capital transfers  2.9 3.0 2.6 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.3 1.9
1 Ratios of unadjusted balance, cyclical component and temporary measures with respect to nominal GDP. Due to the different denominator the ratio of 
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Appendix B: Breakdown of growth in revenue from taxes and social contributions 
This appendix shows how the various factors that contribute to a change in the structural ratio 
of taxes and social contributions to GDP are derived. The following notation is used: 
 
R  Revenue  category 
i R   i=p: private part, i=g: public part of R  ( =+
p g RR R ) 
i m   Macro base for R  in real terms, i as above 
m P   Deflator for m (as in ESCB cyclical adjustment) 
i ε  Elasticity  of 
i R  with respect to 
i m  for i=p,g ; elasticity of R  with respect to 
m P  for i=d 
l R   Impact of legislation changes  
Y  Nominal  GDP 
y  Real  GDP 
P    GDP deflator 
X
t g   Growth rate of a variable  X  
− ∆= − 1 tt t X XX  
C X   Cyclical component of a variable  X  
T X   Cyclically adjusted value of a variable  X  () =−
TC XX X  
  
Direct taxes on household income, direct taxes on corporate income, indirect taxes and social 
contributions are treated separately, such as in the ESCB method for the computation of 
cyclically adjusted budget balances. Following the ESCB approach, the same macro bases are 
used, and the cycle is assumed to arise from real developments in the private sector. For the 
purpose of a broader analysis of structural developments, the impact of the change in public 
sector employment on income taxes or of growth of government consumption (via 
intermediate consumption, social benefits in kind) on turnover taxes can also be assessed here. 
In addition, as tax payments are in many cases linked to the nominal growth of macro bases, a 
“deflator effect” can also be calculated.  
 
The calculation proceeds in three stages. First, the breakdown is derived on the basis of the 
unadjusted growth of the macroeconomic base. Second, the parts of the cyclical component 
that can be attributed to fiscal drag and decoupling are derived and subtracted from the 
unadjusted figures. Finally, ratios to nominal trend GDP are taken.  
 
1. Breakdown of development in unadjusted revenue 
A change in the revenue category R  can be decomposed into three factors:36 
 
{ { { ∆= ∆ +∆ + ∆
Change due to Normal change Residual
legislation change (narrow)
ln r
tt t t RR RR    (1) 
                                                 
36 This equation implicitly defines a residual (“narrow”) as the difference between the left-hand side of this 
equation with the two first terms on the right-hand side. This “narrow” residual might deviate from the 
residual given in Table 2 because there are some components of taxes that are regarded as unconnected to the 
macroeconomic development. Those are excluded at this stage of the calculations and are added later on to 
the residual given in Table 2. 
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In this formulation, “normal” change denotes the change in the revenue category that would 
have been expected on the basis of the development in the macro bases and the elasticities in 
the absence of changes in legislation. In principle, we allow for different elasticities for the 
private sector and public sector parts of the revenue category and for the deflator. In 
particular, the deflator effect might be zero ( 0
d ε = ) as in the case of excise taxes. The 
normal development is defined as follows: 
 
{ εεε −− ∆= + + 1424 31 4 24 31 4 24 3 -1 1 1
Normal change Private sector, Public sector, Deflator effect
real real
pg m np m p g m g d P
tt t t t t t Rg R g R g R  
To derive the fiscal drag and the decoupling of the macroeconomic base from GDP, the 
normal change is decomposed further. The revenue change that would lead to a constant ratio 
to GDP is termed a “neutral” change. The decoupling from GDP arises if the growth rate of 
the base differs from the growth rate of GDP. Finally, fiscal drag occurs if the elasticity 
differs from one. Summing up, this decomposition can be calculated as follows:37 
 
{ ε −− − − ∆= + + − + − 123 123 1 442 4 4 3 11 1 1
Normal change Neutral change, Neutral change, Decoupling of the  Fiscal drag,
real deflator effect base from GDP, private s
private sector, real
() ( 1 )
pp ny P m y p p m p
tt t t t t t t t t Rg Rg R g g R g R
ε −−− +− + − +−
144244 3
14 4 244 31 4 4 2 4 4 3
ector, real
111
Decoupling of the Fiscal drag, Decoupling of the
base from GDP, public sector, real base from GDP,
public sector, real deflator 
() ( 1 ) ()
gg m my g g m g PP







  (2) 
 
2. Cyclical adjustment and changes in R   
In the ESCB methodology the cyclical adjustment only concerns the private sector and real 
macroeconomic bases. Since the disaggregated approach requires that neutral change, fiscal 
drag and decoupling terms for the private sector be adjusted separately for cyclical influences, 
the cyclical component 




== + −+ − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
(1 )
pC C pC C pC
Cp p p p p
pp p p
my m y R m
RR R R R
my m y R m
 
The various terms of the above equation are then assigned to the different components of the 
normal change: 
 
Cyclically adjusted … 















                                                 
37 Note that VAT and excise taxes have to be considered separately since the elasticity with respect to the 
deflator is different. For progressive direct taxes payable by households, it is assumed that fiscal drag occurs 
only with respect to the growth in the average compensation. In the case of a lagged relationship between 
macroeconomic base and tax revenue this will show up in the fiscal drag and decoupling terms. The fiscal 
drag is divided according to the relative weight of the elasticities for different time lags. 
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3. Change in the structural revenue ratio 
In a first step the change in the cyclically adjusted revenue ratio is calculated as follows (note 
that the neutral change vanishes in the decomposition of the structural revenue ratio): 
 
{ {
−− − ⎛⎞ ∆− ∆ ∆ − ∆
∆= − = = + + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ 144244 3
11 1
Contribution Residual Contribution of





TT Y T l n T Y Tr T
RY t t tt t t tt t
tt TT T T T T
tt t t t t
RR g R RR g RR R
gg
YY Y Y Y Y
 
The contribution of the normal change to changes in the structural revenue ratio derives from 
fiscal drag and decoupling. The first term on the right-hand side below is approximately zero 











14444 4 244444 3 144444 4 2444444 3
144 2
11 1 1 1 - 1
0 Private sector, real
11
Public sector, real
(- ) ( - 1 )
() ( 1 )
TT p T T p T
gg
nT Y T yT P Y T m y p p m p
tt t t tt tt t t t t t t
TTT T
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tt t t t
TT
tt
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11
Deflator effects
() ( 1 )
mm PP d P
tt t t t
TT
tt
gg R g R
YY
 
In the case of a common elasticity ε , with  == / /, , ,
ii mmRRi p g  and making use of the 
approximation above, this equation simplifies to 
ε −− − ∆− + − +
=+
14444 4 244444 31 4 4 4 424 4 44 3
11 1
Decoupling Fiscal drag
(- ) ( - 1 ) ()
TT m T T m nT Y T m P y P m P
tt t tt tt t tt t
TT T
tt t
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Appendix C: Description of country-specific extensions of the approach 
This appendix summarises adaptations of the standard approach for individual countries. 
 
C.1 Belgium 
Price effects in the evolution of the revenue and primary expenditure ratio 
In Belgium nearly all public wages and replacement incomes are automatically indexed to 
consumer prices. Whenever a moving average of the monthly “health index” − i.e. the 
national index of consumer prices excluding certain products which are considered “harmful” 
such as gasoline, tobacco and alcohol − exceeds a threshold (which is always 2% higher than 
the previous threshold), wages and replacement incomes are increased by 2%. For public 
wages and public-sector pensions, this happens two months after the threshold has been 
exceeded. For other replacement incomes, the delay is only one month. As the resulting 
automatic increase of public wages and replacement incomes is not necessarily identical to the 
increase of the GDP deflator (due to terms of trade effects, the delay in the indexation, the use 
of the health index, etc.) for each year, the primary expenditure ratio can be (significantly) 
affected by this indexation scheme. 
 
It is important to isolate these automatic changes in the primary expenditure ratio from other 
spending developments. First, roughly similar changes affect the revenue ratio as most 
private-sector wages are also indexed in some way to consumer inflation. This implies that the 
ratio of income taxes and social contributions is equally affected by differences between the 
wage indexation and the increase in the GDP deflator. Hence, these price effects are thought 
to be relatively neutral for the government balance. Second, this indexation is built into the 
legal framework and does not result from actual spending decisions. Hence, the true spending 
stance during any given year is better measured by an indicator excluding this price effect. 
 
The proposed calculation of the indexation effect is straightforward: the difference between 
the growth in public-sector wages and replacement incomes due to the automatic indexation 
and the increase in the GDP deflator, multiplied by the share of these spending items in trend 
GDP. 
 
Also the (structural) revenue ratio changes if price developments affect the budgetary 
categories in a different way than GDP. This is the case for VAT, for example, which is 
linked to private consumption. If the private consumption deflator grows more strongly than 
the GDP deflator, the (structural) ratio of VAT to GDP ceteris paribus increases. 
Furthermore, we use the private consumption deflator to derive real compensation of 
employees, the macroeconomic base of wage taxes and social contributions. Therefore, part of 
the decoupling of the tax base from GDP is owing to price developments. The same holds for 
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C.2 Germany 
Categorisation of taxes according to their link to macroeconomic bases 
For the cyclical adjustment procedure and the calculation of the breakdown of the 
development in tax revenue and social contributions in the disaggregated approach, the 
categorisation differs form the ESA 95 categories underlying Table 1. The rearrangement is 
motivated by the idea of matching the revenue categories with the appropriate 
macroeconomic base. More specifically, wage taxes are linked to employment and average 
compensation of employees. For the newly defined category “profit-related  taxes” 
(corporation tax, non-assessed tax on earnings, local business tax, interest withholding tax and 
assessed income tax), we use entrepreneurial and investment income as the macroeconomic 
base. The development in VAT is connected with private consumption and private 
homebuilding investment. For social contributions, we only consider contributions paid by 
employers and employees and exclude, for example, payments of the Federal Employment 
Agency. In general, there are parts of taxes and social contributions that are excluded in the 
calculation with the disaggregated approach since they are assumed to be unconnected to the 
macroeconomic development. 
 
The categorisation that is actually used in the calculations underlies the presentation of results 
in Table 2a. In Table 2 for Germany the categories are regrouped according to the system 
given in Table  1. Furthermore, the parts of social contributions and tax revenue that are 
assumed to be unconnected to the macroeconomic development and are, therefore, not 
contained in Table  2a, are added to the residual of the respective categories in Table  2. 
Therefore, the change of the revenue that is explained in Table 2a deviates from the total 
change of social contributions and tax revenue as given in Table 2. 
Germany
Table 2a: Change in tax revenue and social contributions, adjusted for cyclical influences and temporary measures
1)
(as a percentage of trend GDP)  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 98-04
Wage taxes -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -1.2
   Fiscal drag 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9
   Decoupling of tax base from GDP -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4
   Legislation changes -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 0.0 0.1 -0.6 -1.8
   Residual 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1
   Memorandum item: included in expenditure 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Social contributions -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -1.1
   Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Decoupling of tax base from GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -1.0
   Legislation changes 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3
   Residual -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5
   Memorandum item: included in expenditure 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4
Profit-related taxes 0.4 0.6 0.7 -1.3 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2
   Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
   Decoupling of tax base from GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
   Legislation changes -0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2
   Residual 0.5 0.3 0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.1 0.1 -0.3
VAT 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
   Fiscal drag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Decoupling of tax base from GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
   Legislation changes 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
   Residual 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.5
   Memorandum item: included in expenditure 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Excise taxes -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.3
   Fiscal drag -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
   Decoupling of tax base from GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
   Legislation changes 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9
   Residual 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
1 The categories considered here deviate from ESA 95. They are chosen to link tax components to appropropriate macro bases.
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Cyclical adjustment of the pension insurance scheme 
In Germany, the pension payments of the statutory pension insurance depend on the growth of 
average compensation of employees. Roughly speaking, each individual pension is raised in 
the middle of a year t by the growth rate of the gross average compensation of employees in 
the year t-1. Therefore, pension payments are considered as an additional expenditure 
category in the cyclical adjustment procedure. As the macroeconomic base, average gross 
wages and salaries per employed person in the two preceding years is employed. Since the 
pension insurance scheme was, in principle, bound by law to balance its budget by 2003 it is 
assumed until 2003 that a “cyclical adaptation” of contribution rates ensures that there is no 
cyclical deficit in the pension insurance scheme. The cyclical adaptation is given as the 
difference between the cyclical impact on pension payments and the (hypothetical) cyclical 
impact on social contributions to the pension insurance scheme for fixed contribution rates. 
Starting with 2004, the cyclical impact on the social contributions to the pension insurance 
scheme are calculated under the assumption that contribution rates are independent of the 
cycle – as also in the other branches of the social insurance system. 
 
Cyclical adjustment of legislation changes  
In the calculation of the cyclically adjusted legislation changes we have taken into account the 
assumption made with respect to the cyclical adjustment of the pension insurance scheme. As 
was mentioned above, we assume that until 2003 a “cyclical adaptation” of contribution rates 
ensures that there is no cyclical deficit in the pension insurance scheme. To adjust for cyclical 
influences, we subtract the change in the cyclical adaptation from legislation changes.  
 
C.3 Portugal 
Personal income tax 
To take into account the impact of inflation on the growth of personal income tax receipts, the 
following formula is used to calculate the normal change in receipts (trend growth rates of 
macroeconomic bases for receipts raised in the private sector incomes and the actual ones for 
receipts raised on public sector incomes): 
 
[] 1 t t R * u e u) e (w * ε ∆R − + + − − =  
 
where w is the nominal growth of the wage bill (private or public), e the growth rate of 
employment (private or public) and u the update of the limits of the tax brackets and other 
parameters of the tax. This formula tries to capture the fact that the progressivity of the tax 
only works when nominal wages grow above the update of the parameters of the tax. It is 
worth referring that in the absence of legislation changes in the personal income tax, the u 
corresponds to the update of the limits of the tax brackets and other parameters considered in 
the State Budget (October of the previous year), which in the last few years is equal to the 
expected inflation also taken into account in the Budget. This growth rate is normally used in 
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Highlighted EU transactions in Table 2 
The following table shows the definition of the “of which EU” categories for Table 2 in the 
case of Portugal in the third column. The first two columns show the categorisation as 
underlying Table 1 together with the adjustments in comparison to the ESA95 classification. 
 
 
Portugal: Definition of EU transactions for Table 2
Total current revenue
   Indirect taxes
   Other current transfers receivable
Total current expenditure 
      Subsidies
      Other current transfers payable
Total capital revenue
Total capital expenditure 
     capital transfers 
Total current revenue
   Indirect taxes
   Other current transfers receivable
Total current expenditure 
      Subsidies
      Other current transfers payable
Total capital revenue
Total capital expenditure 
     capital transfers   + (-D.9) Capital transfers paid by EU budget to non-government - (-
D.9) Capital transfers paid by government to EU budget
Adjustments to ESA95, general case
 + (D.75) Current transfers paid by EU budget to non-government - 
(D.74 + D.75) Current international co-operation and miscellaneous 
current transfers paid by government to EU budget + net payments 
to EU budget, if country is a net payer
- (D.9) Capital transfers paid by EU budget to government
- (D.74+D.75) Current transfers paid by EU budget to government + 
net receipts from EU budget, if country is a net recipient
+ (-D.3) Subsidies paid by EU budget
+ (D.2) Indirect taxes received by EU budget
- (D.74+D.75) Current transfers paid by EU budget to government + 
net receipts from EU budget (net recipient +)
- (D.75) Miscellaneous current transfers paid by government to EU 
- (D.9) Capital transfers paid by EU budget to government
+ (-D.9) Capital transfers paid by EU budget to non-government
+ (-D.3) Subsidies paid by EU budget
+ (D.2) Indirect taxes received by EU budget
Adjustments to ESA95 Items to be highlighted as EU transactions in Table 2
+ (-D.9) Capital transfers paid by EU budget to non-government
+ Net receipts from EU budget (net recipient +)
+ (-D.3) Subsidies paid by EU budget + (D.74+D.75) Current 
transfers paid by EU budget to government (the part included in 
subsidies, including 'nectrality effects')
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